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THE HYPERREGULATORY STATE:
WOMEN, RACE, POVERTY AND SUPPORT
Wendy A. Bach*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself for a moment as a mother seeking help from the
state. Your need might be for education, safety, housing, money,
health care or childcare. Depending on your where you live, your
race, gender, and class position and the composition of your family,
the support you seek is likely to arrive, if arriving at all, in radically
different packages. If you are more likely white than you would be in
a world without structure racism, if you hold an elevated class position
and if you live in an economically privileged community, help is likely
to come in to you in a particular form. For you, help may come in the
form of high quality public schools, child care or home mortgage
deductions, safe streets or employer based, but government subsidized
health care. The support you receive from that subject position is
certainly not enough, but it is not likely to be structured to penalize
you for seeking support. The only real risk you run by seeking support
is the possibility that you might not get it.
In contrast, if you are a poor, and more likely than in a world
without structural racism, African American, and if you are living as a
parent in the inner city, any support you receive is likely to be
structured quite differently. The meager support that may be available
comes in the form of welfare, Food Stamps, public housing,
underfunded, overpoliced schools and publically funded, overcrowded
health care facilities. Moreover, and central to the arguments put
*
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forward here, this support is likely to come at an enormous punitive
risk both within the initial social welfare system and beyond. The
regulatory mechanisms of those systems of support are likely to
function in at least two ways. They will, if you are lucky and
resourceful enough to navigate the many barriers to receipt, dole out
some much-needed but meager support. But the price of that support
is exposure to a set of mechanisms, here termed regulatory
intersectionality, by which regulatory systems intersect to share
information and heighten the adverse consequences of what those
systems quite easily deem to be unlawful or noncompliant conduct.
Quite simply if you are poor, African American and living in the inner
city, by seeking support you risk far more than simply being deprived
of support. By seeking support you elevate your risk of exposure to
ever more punitive consequences. You risk exposure, in the examples
in this article, to a child welfare system that is far more likely to take
and keep your children and in which your children are likely to fare
horribly. You also risk exposure to a criminal “justice” system that is
more likely to impose harsh criminal consequences for your allegedly
deviant conduct. The state you encounter not only fails to respond to
your need in any meaningful way. Instead the state is hyperregulatory,
meaning here that its mechanisms are targeted, by race, class, gender
and place, to exert punitive social control over poor, African American
women, their families and their communities.
Feminist political and legal theorists are currently engaged in a
vital project. This work, led by scholars like Martha Fineman and
Maxine Eichner, teaches that both dominant American political theory
and, more importantly, the structures of current state institutions fail to
enable families to meet dependency needs and are, in the name of an
emaciated view of autonomy, obscenely content to leave gross
inequality in place. This work provides a potent critique, a clearly
better vision of the state we need and a theory that holds great promise
in getting us there. As we consider their vision, however, we must
remember, as the work of Kimberle Crenshaw, Khiara Bridges,
Kaaryn Gustafson and Dorothy Roberts, among many others, counsels,
that if we are to build institutions that are responsive to some of the
most vulnerable among us, we must seek to understand the particular
institutional realities that constitute the relationship between poor and
disproportionately African American women and the current state, and
we must ask how these particular realities impact the path to a
supportive or responsive state.1
1

Feminist theory has long been criticized for centering the experiences of white,
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This article builds on the work of critical race theory,
intersectionality theory, and critical sociology to make three
interrelated arguments. First, the article argues that social welfare
institutions that serve and target poor communities are characterized
by phenomena here termed “regulatory intersectionality,” defined as
the means by which regulatory systems intersect to share information
and heighten the adverse consequences of unlawful or noncompliant
conduct originally observed in a social welfare setting. Second, in
addition to introducing and exploring the specific functioning of
regulatory intersectionality, the article borrows from the work of Loïc
Wacquant to introduce a second broader set of terms: hyperregulation
and the hyperregulatory state. While regulatory intersectionality
describes the functioning of a particular set of administrative
structures, the hyperregulatory state is broader. It encompasses a wide
range of mechanisms that are targeted by race, class, gender, and place
and exert social control over poor, African American women, their
families, and their communities. Third and finally, the article builds
on and responds to theories of vulnerability and the supportive or
responsive state. In this vein it argues that the mechanisms of
regulatory intersectionality render poor African American women,
their families, and their communities radically more rather than less
vulnerable. Because of this, in order to realize a truly supportive state
citizen, middle class women and eliding the experiences of women who differ along
the lines of race, citizenship, class, or other identity axes. Historically, by centering
the experiences of white women of privilege, streams within feminist discourse have
given rise to social policy that at best fails to meet the needs of poor women and
women of color and at worst contributes to their continued subordination. The
critique waged by Kimberle Crenshaw in 1991 that the domestic violence and antirape movements, by centering the experiences of white citizen women, at best erased
and at worst undermined the safety and needs of women of color is among the most
trenchant of such critiques. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping The Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 1241 (1991). For foundational pieces on this topic see, e.g., bell hooks, AIN'T
I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); ALL THE WOMEN ARE WHITE,
ALL THE BLACKS ARE MEN, BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE: BLACK WOMEN'S
STUDIES (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds., 1982); THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:
WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa eds.,
2d ed. 1983). For relevant readings specific to some of the social welfare policy that
is discussed in Section III of this article, see e.g. Jill Quadagno, THE COLOR OF
WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994). This article
does not argue that either Fineman or Eichner ignore the institutional structures that
target poor, disproportionately African American communities. This history does,
however, counsel careful attention to these particular experiences and the particular
responses that might lead to truly supportive state.
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we must ask difficult questions about how we might meet the
extraordinary needs of those living in poverty (as well as those who
are not living poverty) in a way that supports rather than undermines
the abilities of families and communities to thrive.
The article proceeds as follows. Section I provides an overview of
the political theory referenced above with a particular emphasis on its
description of the functioning of the social welfare state. Section II
then contextualizes this political theory within current discussions of
social welfare history, sociology and critical race and intersectionality
theory and introduces the framework of hyperregulation and the
hyperregulatory state. Section III offers a description of the regulatory
intersectionality as it plays out in public health and welfare settings.
Drawing together the formal and informal structures of legal
regulatory institutions and research documenting the disproportionate
impact of these policies on poor women and poor communities of
color, it highlights first the exposure of poor pregnant women to child
welfare intervention and criminal prosecution as a result of drug
testing in public hospitals; and second the referral of individuals to
child protective agencies when welfare applicants test positive for
drugs or refuse drug tests. In each of these cases, the poor women
seeking support, who are disproportionately African American, find
themselves subject not only to extraordinary surveillance but to a far
reaching interconnected set of civil and criminal regulatory systems
designed to impose escalating punitive consequences for their
behavior. Finally Section IV concludes by offering a very preliminary
discussion of the theoretical and practice implications of regulatory
intersectionality and hyperregulation for building a supportive state.
I. The Failures of Liberal Theory and the Idea of the Supportive State
The recent work of Martha Fineman and Maxine Eichner2
2

When referencing the work of Fineman I am referring primarily to Fineman’s
work on Vulnerability and Dependency: Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable
Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 257 (2010) [hereinafter
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject]; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject:
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008)
[hereinafter Fineman, Anchoring Equality]; and MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) [hereinafter FINEMAN, THE
AUTONOMY MYTH]. When referencing Eichner, I am referring primarily to MAXINE
EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT AND AMERICA’S
POLITICAL IDEALS (2010). In these texts, Fineman and Eichner differ both as a
matter of the methodology of how one might reach the vision of a supportive (in
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challenges us to reconceptualize the very subject of law and the role of
the state.3 As to the subject, Fineman and Eichner call the fundamental
bluff of liberalism. They remind us that, as much as liberal political
theory is built around the assumption that we are all autonomous and
able, if simply left alone, to realize our full potential, in lived
experience this is very far from true. They remind us that, while we
are sometimes autonomous, we are frequently not. We are instead
dependent and vulnerable. In addition, and crucially, some subjects
are tremendously privileged while others “are caught in systems of
disadvantage that are almost impossible to transcend.”4 As to the
current operations of state in the domestic context, Fineman and
Eichner offer a searing indictment. Each posits that the result of
liberal rhetoric is a fundamentally unresponsive state. Vulnerable and
dependent subjects are left alone to succeed or fail and the profound
impacts of privilege and prejudice remain undisturbed. When people
fail to live up to idealized notions of autonomy, they are blamed,5 and
either deprived of support or, as Eichner vividly describes in her
discussion of U.S. child welfare policy, severely punished.6
The positive vision of the state that Eichner and Fineman offer is
markedly different and, this article maintains, far better than the
current state of affairs. While Fineman and Eichner differ on crucial
issues of policy, the focus of their critique and the results they
envision,7 they both call for a state that responds to vulnerability
Eichner’s term) or responsive (in Fineman’s) state, and these differences matter a
great deal. They also differ significantly in what the end goal looks like, particularly
on issues of how care work should be compensated. Throughout this section I will
highlight, in footnotes, some of these differences. However, for the purposes of this
portion of the article, I highlight the ways in which their work complements and
builds upon each other’s.
3
Fineman and Eichner’s work focuses on U.S. social policy in the domestic
context, as do references to the “state” in this paper.
4
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 257. Eichner’s critique of liberal
theory begins not in current political discourse and its manifestations in social policy
but in a fundamental critique of Rawlsian political theory as exemplified by his work
in RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE. See, e.g. EICHNER, supra note 2, at 17-26
(critiquing the failure of Rawls to incorporate the role of the family in meeting
dependency needs). In this article, however, I focus not on Eichner’s critique of
Rawls per se but on her analysis of how the idea of autonomy profoundly limits the
ability of American political discourse to justify government institutions that meet
dependency needs
5
Id. at 257.
6
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 119-123.
7
For discussion, by Eichner, of the differences between her vision of the
mechanism of the supportive state and Fineman’s, see id. at 75-77. Eichner identifies
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through the creation of policies and institutions that address
dependency. In Eichner’s terms, rather than structuring policy in a
way that either leaves families alone to meet needs or punishes them
for failing to meeting needs, the supportive state would,
[a]t a minimum . . . arrange institutions in such a way that
family members can, through exercising diligent but not
Herculean efforts, meet the basic physical, mental and
emotional needs of children and other dependents and
promote human development while avoiding impoverishment
or immiseration.8
Moreover, Fineman in particular believes that the focus on
vulnerability on the one hand and responsiveness on the other provides
a powerful mechanism to address the profound inequalities that exist in
U.S. society. Vulnerability theory, in Fineman’s analysis forms the
basis of a claim that state institutions must provide not just formal
equal access but the material conditions necessary to achieve
substantive equality.9 Fineman and Eichner provide an essential
critique and a compelling vision.
Building on that work, this article shifts the focus of inquiry to the
punitive mechanisms of the state. It seeks to describe the specific ways
that the mechanisms of the state actually operate for those who are, by
virtue of the intersecting implications of class, race, gender and
geography, among the most vulnerable. The article argues, in Section
III, that in institutions like public hospitals and welfare offices, poor
people, and disproportionately poor people of color, face a
hyperregulatory state. Mechanisms of the state that purport to be in
place to provide what remains of a shredded social safety net go far
beyond failing to provide adequate support or even exacting a punitive
price for the support within the social welfare system. Instead, because
of their position and because of their need, poor families face an
crucial differences between her vision and Fineman’s particularly on the issue of
whether parents should be compensated for care work. In addition, although their
work is extraordinarily complementary, they do differ in significant ways in terms of
emphasis. In particular Fineman frames her Vulnerability project around the
profound failure of Equal Protection doctrine to support the conditions for
substantive, as opposed to formal, equality. Eichner’s work in THE SUPPORTIVE
STATE focuses primarily on how state policies and social mechanisms can be
restructured to support the work of families in meeting dependency needs.
8
Id. at 78-79.
9
See infra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
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extraordinarily punitive state, one whose systems intersect, in a
mechanism referred to here as regulatory intersectionality, to exact
escalating punitive consequences on those who seek its support.
Before describing those mechanisms, however, this Section lays out in
more detail Fineman and Eichner’s theory of the liberal subject, the
current, largely unresponsive state, and the responsive state they
collectively envision.
A. The Autonomous Subject and the Vulnerable Subject
The theory of the supportive state begins, fundamentally, with a
critique the American ideal of the person to be governed. Liberal
political theory, as manifested in dominant U.S. political discourse, is
built, “on its conceptualization of individuals as autonomous and
able.”10 We are, in this formulation, people who can pull ourselves up
by our proverbial bootstraps. The purpose of government then, is to
make sure that nothing gets in our way. We need liberty to protect
against incursions on the exercise of our autonomy, and we need
formal equality, some sense not that we will all end up equal but that
we perhaps start the race at the same point, so that we can all reach our
ultimate potential. In popular discourse, this proverbial race is
primarily an economic one. We are all, in theory, free participants in
the market, and nothing is supposed to get in the way of realizing our
economic potential.
The problem with these ideas is, in short, that they “… [seem] to
mistake this moral ideal for an account of the human condition.”11 It
does so in two fundamental ways. First, they entirely fail to account
for the fact that we are often dependent. We are young, old, sick and
unable to meet our needs. We are dependent, and we are vulnerable.
Second, the theory fails to acknowledge that, “[f]ar from having equal
opportunity, many individuals are caught in systems of disadvantage
that are almost impossible to transcend.”12 Moreover these critiques
are not just issues of theory. These fallacies are manifest in the state
of American law and policy.

10

EICHNER, supra note 2, at 17. Fineman makes clear that in her view notions of
autonomy “defined in terms of expectations of self-sufficiency” dominates our
political discourse. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 259.
11
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 21.
12
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 257.
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1. The Failure to Account For and Respond to Dependency
The first broad critique is that this political discourse, as manifest
in U.S. policy, fails almost entirely to account for the way that
families, broadly defined, meet the dependency needs of its members.
Adults in families care for the young and old, and adult members care
for each other in a myriad of ways. And, in a phenomenon termed
“derivative dependency,” when the caretakers, who are almost always
women, provide this care work they do so at the expense of their own
ability to be those idealized economic actors.13
A few examples make this point evident. In the last several
decades we have experienced radical shifts in the nature of work and
family. The conceptual ideal of the two parent family with one
breadwinner barely exists and in fact never existed as a significant
presence in large swaths of communities of color. Nevertheless it still
forms the conceptual basis for many work related policies. Today,
70% percent of children live in households where all parents in the
household, be there two or one, work. Despite these radical shifts in
the nature of family and work, the workplace has barely shifted to
accommodate these changes. In fact, as Eichner notes, “a comparison
of policies in 173 countries found that when it came to parental leave
protections in the workplace, the United States came in dead last, tied
with only three other countries: Liberia, Papua New Guinea and
Swaziland.”14 In addition to facing a workplace that is tremendously
inflexible, American workers are consistently called on to work far
more hours than those in other western countries.15 Adding to the
difficulties created by the lack of flexible workplace policies and long
hours is the absence of high quality affordable care. Although children
who receive high quality care tend to fare quite well, due in large part
to the extraordinarily low compensation offered to those who engage
in paid care work, the vast majority of available childcare is lightly
regulated and of low quality.16
Women who both work and fulfill caregiving roles find themselves
13

FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2, at 34-37.
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 27 (citing Jody Heyman, Alison Earle, Jeffrey
Hayes, Project on Global Working Families, The Work, Family and Equity Index:
How Does the United States Measure Up? (2007), available at
http://www.mcgill.ca/ihsp/sites/mcgill.ca.ihsp/files/WFEI2007FINAL.pdf
(last
visited December 29, 2012)).
15
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 39-40.
16
Id. at 40.
14
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lagging behind on a variety of economic indicators. While women in
couples struggle to maintain economic equality, single women raising
children face harsher circumstances and harder choices. They
generally must attempt to balance care work with employment, but the
lower they are on the economic ladder, the more difficult this balance
and the harsher the consequences should their carefully calibrated
work and care plans fall apart. For the poorest women, who are
disproportionately women of color, attempting to provide care for their
own dependent children and family members, all these statistics and
policies are significantly worse. Low wage workplaces tend to be less
flexible and more precarious than those higher on the economic ladder.
The extraordinary expense of childcare and the lack of any significant
effort to subsidize that care force women into unstable and often
unsuitable childcare arrangements and into a set of arrangements that
are nearly guaranteed to fail. And whereas prior to the 1996 Welfare
Reform Act, some women could rely on Aid to Families With
Dependent Children to provide some level of support should they
choose or be forced into unemployment, today the combined impact of
work requirements, time limits, and the extraordinary push in many
states to eliminate welfare, make the choices poor women face all the
more difficult. Moreover, as wealthier women seek to meet the care
needs of their families, they employ poor, disproportionately
immigrant women, and provide them with generally low wages and
even fewer benefits.
In short, despite the ideal of an autonomous adult actors and a
family that is supposed to provide care work, the reality is that meeting
these obligations is extraordinarily difficult. It is, for both Fineman
and Eichner, our autonomy-centered political rhetoric that allows the
state to fail to intervene to provide additional support:
[The] assumptions—that individual liberty and equality are
appropriately recognized by law, that dependency is not a
condition that law needs to recognize; that the state should be
neutral on issues of family; and that the state should not
adulterate families internal dynamics—prevent policies that
effectively support families.17
2. The Failure to Account for and Respond to Structural Inequality
The second theoretical and practical critique of the way the
17

Id. at 27.
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autonomous subject drives policy focuses on structural inequality. As
Fineman aptly puts it, in our society “[p]rofound inequalities are
tolerated – even justified – by reference to individual responsibility
and the working of an asserted meritocracy within a free market.”18
We are a nation characterized by profound economic inequality,
inequalities that are again more starkly felt in communities of color.
Although an in depth discussion of the profound inequities woven
into our current society is well beyond the scope of this article, a few
statistics serve as a potent reminder of these phenomena. Since the
1970s, the income gap between those at the bottom and those at the top
has continued to widen, with an ever-smaller share going to those at
the bottom and in the middle and more going to those at the top.
According to the Congressional Research Service, “… the U.S. income
distribution appears to be among the most unequal of all major
industrialized countries and the United States appears to be among the
nations experiencing the greatest increases in measure of income
dispersion.”19 Looking in particular at African Americans, who are
disproportionately affected by the social welfare policies examined in
Section III of this article, reveals significant income disparities
between blacks and whites. For example, sixty five percent of blacks
studied in the most recent PEW Charitable Trust Economic Mobility
Project report, “were raised at the bottom of the income ladder
compared with only 11 percent of whites.”20
In addition, although the popular rhetoric about autonomy might
suggest that it is quite possible, by hard work and effort, to move up
the economic ladder during one’s lifetime, Congressional Research
Service claims that “empirical analysis suggests that children born into
18

Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 251 (Fineman’s critique is
aimed squarely at the failures of Equal Protection doctrine. In this piece and in a
prior piece on vulnerability, Fineman, Anchoring Equality, supra note 2, Fineman
indicts the doctrine for its utter failure to provide any means to realize substantive
equality. This article draws on Fineman’s work on vulnerability, however, not to
engage in the important debates around how that theory might add to Equal
Protection analysis but for its description of the theory and practice of the state as it
operates in American society.
19
Linda Levine, The U.S. Income Distribution and Mobility: Trends and
International Comparisons, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., summary (2012),
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42400.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2013).
20
Econ. Mobility Project, Pursuing the American Dream: Economic Mobility
Across Generations, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 18 (2012),
www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pursuing_American_Dream.pd
f. [Hereinafter Pursuing the American Dream].
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low-income families have not become more likely and may have
become less likely to surpass their parents position at the bottom of the
income distribution.”21 In fact, according to recent data, only four
percent of those raised in the bottom fifth of household earnings make
it all the way to the top quintile.22 In contrast, 43% of Americans
raised in the bottom fifth will remain there as adults.23 Blacks are also
significantly more likely to be stuck at the bottom than whites. “More
than half of black adults (53 percent for family income and 50 percent
for family wealth) raised at the bottom remain stuck there as adults,
but only a third of white (33 percent for both) do.”24
Despite these and other clear inequalities woven into our society
along lines of gender, class, and race, our social policy does little to
nothing to address these inequalities. Instead, and this is the heart of
the critique of what Fineman terms The Autonomy Myth,25 American
social policy is largely “unresponsive to those who are disadvantaged,
blaming individuals for their situations and ignoring the inequity
woven into the systems in which we are all mired.”26
B. Towards a More Responsive State
The social policy and jurisprudence that results from this
constricted view of autonomy justifies and gives rise, in Fineman and
Eichner’s view, to a non-responsive state.27 “… [T]he same
problematic assumptions that are embodied in political theory are also
21

Levine, supra note 19, at 14.
Pursuing the American Dream, supra note 20, at 6.
23
Pursuing the American Dream, supra note 20, at 3.
24
Id. at 20.
25
FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2.
26
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 257.
27
By characterizing their collective description of the state as absent and
unresponsive, I do not mean to suggest that either author fails to acknowledge that
means by which law and social policy constitute both the family and the overlapping
means by which dependency needs are met or unmet. In fact, both authors clearly
acknowledge the way that law shapes the very nature of the family. See, e.g.,
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 55-57 (2010) (“Just as there is no natural, pre-political
family, there are no natural, pre-political ways in which families function. In today’s
complex society, the ways in which families function are always deeply and
inextricably intertwined with government policy.” (citing Frances E. Olsen, The
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 MICH. J. L. REFORM 835, 836 (1985)).
See also FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 2, at 151 (“While the family
may be viewed as private in our rhetoric, it is highly regulated and controlled by the
state.”).
22
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present in US law.”28 If, rather than accepting this constrained view of
autonomy and non-responsive state, the “primary objective [was
instead] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of opportunity
and access, we may see a need for a more active and responsive state. .
. .”29 This envisioned state would not, “simply protect citizens’
individual rights from violation by others.” Instead it would “actively
support the expanded list of liberal goods by creating institutions that
facilitate caretaking and human development.”30 This envisioned state
would also move past constrained notions of formal equality towards a
much more robust and substantive demand on state institutions to
create the possibility for real equality. The “primary objective [would
be] ensuring and enhancing a meaningful equality of opportunity…”31
The non-responsive state manifests itself in two primary ways:
first in its failure to regulate the workplace in ways that allow families
to balance employment and caretaking and second in the constricted
and punitive ways in which it provides assistance to those in need.
The envisioned state would be restructured to respond in both these
areas.
1. The Failure to Regulate the Market and Regulation of the Market
in the Supportive State
The state’s failure to regulate the market is a central concern of the
theory of the supportive state.
With a few limited exceptions,32
28

EICHNER, supra note 2, at 27.
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 260.
30
Id. Although Fineman frames it differently, and again focuses more squarely
on the failures of equality doctrine to meet the challenges of structural inequality,
Fineman’s framing is similar. In her terms,
29

…. [C]onsideration of vulnerability brings societal institutions, in addition
to the state and individual into discussion and under scrutiny. . . . The nature
of human vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state must be
more responsive to that vulnerability. It fulfills that responsibility primarily
through the establishment and support of societal institutions.”
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 255-56.
31
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 260.
32
Eichner notes the existence of the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)
as the only federal legislation specifically designed to address the ability of families
to meet caretaking needs. Although tremendously important for what is does, FMLA
is limited in both the employees it covers and the support it provides. In short the
Act guarantees up to twelve weeks of leave for certain caretaking activities for
approximately 50% of the workforce. Because it is unpaid, however, according to at
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American law provides comparatively few restraints on the market
designed to support families in meeting the care needs of their
dependents.
The supportive state, in contrast, would “focus on
limiting coercion by the market,” and would enact policies to “. . .
allow families the institutional space to make important decisions and
to the accomplish important tasks without being completely beholden
to the market.”33 For example, upper hour restrictions on work would
be imposed, time off to meet caretaking needs would be expanded and
compensated and workers would be allowed flexible work hours if
needed to meet caretaking obligations.34
2. The Limited and Punitive Nature of the Safety Net and A Newly
Envisioned Set of Supports
Current U.S. social policy provides a severely limited and highly
punitive safety net for those in poverty. In order to receive the meager
support offered by the state, poor women are stigmatized, forced to
surrender their autonomy, and subjected to an extraordinarily punitive
system as a price for meager support.35 Eichner’s devastating
description of the operation of the current child welfare system
provides a vivid example of how current social policy assumes
autonomy as a baseline and stigmatizes and punishes those who fail to
meet their own needs. Poor families receive little to no support in
parenting successfully while attempting to survive the sometimes
tremendously difficult conditions of poor communities and the lowwage labor market. The vast majority of interventions fall on the
punitive and, for both the children and the families involved,
devastating side. As a general matter, the state only enters when there
is allegation of abuse or neglect. Once the state enters the vast
majority of resources go not into supporting families to parent
successfully but to moving children into foster care. Once in foster
care, the vast majority of children fare very badly. And, as in the case
in so many of these punitive systems, they focus these punitive
resources overwhelmingly on communities of color.
The
consequence, as Dorothy Roberts has so thoroughly and persuasively
least one estimate 78% of workers eligible for leave under the Act cannot take
advantage of it because the of the associated loss in wages. EICHNER, supra note 2, at
36.
33
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 64-65.
34
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 64-65.
35
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 259 (“. . . [T]hose who must
resort to certain forms of state assistance are asked to surrender their autonomy (and
privacy) and are stigmatized as dependent and failures.”).
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demonstrated, is a concerted and often devastatingly effective attack
on poor African American families.36
The supportive state would respond quite differently both for poor
women and for women who are farther up on the economic ladder. In
place of the current child welfare system, the supportive state would be
“premised on the view that children’s welfare is a concurrent rather
than residual responsibility of the state, and that this responsibility
[would be] best met through supporting families in the normal course
of events.”37 The goal of such a state would be “supporting the
development of flourishing children.”38 The supportive state then
would seek to alleviate child poverty and would provide high quality
early education and childcare,39 sufficient access to low income
housing,40 and “policies that ensure access to mental health services
and drug-treatment programs.”41 More generally, the supportive and
responsive state would provide significantly more access to support for
all families in the form of universal health care, subsidized childcare,
and in some iterations, compensation for care work.42
II. Hyperregulation and Poverty
The political theories described above offer a tremendously
productive reframing of the liberal subject and the role of the state and
a strong vision of what the supportive or responsive state might entail.
The idea of placing vulnerability, as opposed to constrained notions of
autonomy, at the center of liberal theory creates a shift in the burden
placed on the state. As Fineman frames it, “[t]he nature of human
vulnerability forms the basis for a claim that the state must be more
responsive to that vulnerability.”43 These theorists also clearly
36

See infra. notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 123.
38
Id. at 123.
39
Id. at 123-124.
40
Id. at 124.
41
Id. at 124.
42
Eichner and Fineman diverge to a certain extent on this issue. Fineman
suggests, in THE AUTONOMY MYTH that care work should be publicly compensated.
THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra n. 2 at 285-87. Eichner rejects this proposal. THE
SUPPORTIVE STATE, supra. n. 2 at 76-77. It is important to note that Eichner and
Fineman also both devote substantial parts of their analysis to the crucial questions
of how the supportive state should support women’s equality. For example, Eichner
suggests policies that would encourage both men and women to provide care work.
Id. at 82-83.
43
Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 2, at 255-56.
37
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understand and acknowledge that poor women, and disproportionately
communities of color, are stigmatized and punished in the current
social welfare system. Their revision of the subject, privacy and
dependency, if adopted, would likely result in some movement
towards eschewing the stigma currently associated with seeking
support.
My concern is not that these theorists fail to pay attention to how
poor women are treated. In fact to varying degrees these realities are
in fact described in their work. Instead, I want to argue, as a next step,
for a heightened focus on the specificity of the mechanisms of support
as they currently operate in low income communities. This focus is
crucial because it seems very possible, given the repeated
marginalization of poor women of color within some of feminist
theory,44 that unless these issues are foregrounded, the appeal of the
narrative of the state as it operates for those not in poverty could easily
dominate the development of this work. This possibility would leave
uninterrogated and untouched those wide swaths of policy that
uniquely and disproportionately impact poor communities in general
and poor communities of color specifically. In this scenario, the
important task of realizing a more supportive state could easily focus
on creating legal structures to facilitate caretaking for some at the
expense of interrogating and dismantling the punitive and
hyperregulatory mechanisms of the those parts of the state targeted at
poor women generally and poor women and communities of color
specifically.45
A variety of sources, from critical race theory, history and
sociology provide a rich context for understanding the mechanisms of
the state as they function specifically in poor communities. In
particular, some specifics from the history of social welfare policy in
the United States explain the bifurcation of support systems in U.S.
social policy, splitting our safety net into one for those in poverty and
another for everyone else. In addition recent discussions within both
44

See infra note 1 and accompanying text.
One example of this phenomena in popular discourse was clear from the
extraordinary focus, among professional women on the publication of Anne Marie
Slaughter’s Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC, July/August 2012,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/07/why-womenstill-cant-have-it-all/309020. For some coverage on the response to the article, see
links embedded in Anne Marie Slaughter, The “Having it All” Debate Convinced Me
To Stop Saying “Having it All,” THE ATLANTIC.COM (July 2, 2012, 9:11AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/the-having-it-all-debateconvinced-me-to-stop-saying-having-it-all/259284/).
45
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sociology and law, describing the status of privacy rights in poor
communities and the means by which legal and social welfare systems,
both civil and criminal, intersect to control poor communities of color
provide an essential framework.
A. A Bit of Social Welfare History
As has been well told elsewhere, at the advent of the New Deal the
United States made a crucial set of decisions about how to structure its
welfare state. Very roughly speaking, the set of supports created in the
1930s and then significantly expanded and reconfigured during 1960s
and the Great Society were split in two.46 One set of supports was
created for a group viewed as workers and therefore deserving of
support. These programs, like Social Security and Medicare, did not
have income cut offs. Although of course certain categories of
workers were originally excluded,47 this category of social supports
were created and remain in place for those who, politically speaking,
paid into the system.48
During the same period (starting during the New Deal and
continuing through the 1960s) another very different set of supports
were created for some in poverty: those deemed worthy of support but
still poor and in need not just of support but, so the dominant political
consensus dictated, of behavioral control.49 Originally Aid to
Dependent Children was created primarily to enable poor white
widows to remain in their homes and care for their children. This
program was, like poverty programs that preceded it, focused strongly
on controlling the behavior of its recipients. Later, during the War on
Poverty and the Great Society, programs like Food Stamps and
Medicaid were added to those programs exclusively for those in or
near poverty. The poverty programs have been, since their very
inception, focused on scrutinizing and controlling the behavior of
recipients. Moreover, as AFDC was transformed, in the 1960s, as the
result of extensive activism and litigation, from a program primarily
46

See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 236-39 (1986).
47
See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890- 1935, 5 (1994).
48
Dorothy Roberts, Welfare Reform and Economic Freedom: Low-Income
Mothers’ Decision About Work At Home and in the Marketplace, 44 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 1029, 1032 (2004).
49
For a discussion of the historical origins of this split in U.S. social welfare
policy and their relationship to who was “deserving,” see id. at 238-39.
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for poor white widows to a program open to poor communities of
color, the nature of extent of behavioral controls became inextricably
linked to structures of racial subordination.50
B. Privacy Deprivation and Criminalization as the Price of Support
Social and behavioral control in American poverty programs is
often accomplished through privacy incursions almost unimaginable in
the regulatory framework of support programs provided to those of
means. Although one could scarcely imagine policies like this as a
condition of receipt of benefits such as the child care or home
mortgage tax deductions, poverty programs regularly invade both the
homes (and more recently the bodies)51 of poor people as a condition
of support. The jurisprudential approval of these practices began in
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyman v. James.52 At issue in that
case was a New York State requirement that welfare recipients consent
to a home inspection as a condition of eligibility. The plaintiffs argued
that while the State was clearly entitled to gather all information
relevant to establishing Ms. James’ eligibility for AFDC, it could not
abrogate her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches
of her home as a condition of her eligibility for AFDC. Despite the
fact that a applicant or recipient who, by definition, has no other means
of support must consent to the search or lose the that support, the
Court held that the requirement did not violate the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.53 In dissent
Justice Douglas states clearly the class distinction at the heart of the
majority opinion:
If the welfare recipient was not Barbara James but a prominent,
affluent cotton or wheat farmer receiving benefit payment for
not growing crops, would not the approach be different?
Welfare in aid of dependent children . . . has an aura of
suspicion. There doubtless are frauds in every sector of public
welfare whether the recipient be a Barbara James or someone
who is prominent or influential. But constitutional rights –
50

See generally QUADAGNO, supra note 1. For commentary on the activism of
African-American women in the Welfare Rights Movement during this period that
includes extensive discussions of the relationship between the Welfare Rights and
Civil Rights movements, see FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE
RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007).
51
See infra notes 188-198 and accompanying text.
52
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317 (1971).
53
Id. at 317.
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here the privacy of the home – are obviously not dependent on
the poverty or on the affluence of the beneficiary; and their
privacy is as important to the lowly as to the mighty.54
Justice Douglas’s views, however did not hold sway. In fact, in recent
years, scholars have carefully detailed the way that poverty-focused
social welfare programs increasingly offer proof both that poor people
hold no genuine right to privacy once they seek support and that, more
and more frequently, poverty focused social welfare programs employ
the methods and modalities of the criminal justice system. These two
related conclusions are strongly articulated in the work of Khiara
Bridges and Kaaryn Gustafson.
Khiara Bridges’s work on New York State’s Prenatal Care
Assistance Program (“PCAP”) program provides strong support for
her thesis that the suggestion that poor women exchange their privacy
rights for support significantly understates the problem. Bridges
centers her analysis around the extraordinary amount of information
collected from low-income women as a price of PCAP. In that
program, as Bridges extensively documents, poor women seeking
prenatal care are forced to provide extensive information to a wide
variety of professionals (nurses, social workers and the like) about
subjects ranging from her diet, her income, her history with child
welfare agencies, her immigration status, her mental health history, her
relationship history, any history of violence, her use of contraception
and her parenting plans, all well before she accesses this support. As
is the case in the examples in Section III of this article, in the PCAP
setting, the effect is that “poor women’s private lives are made
available for state surveillance and punitive state responses and they
are exposed to the possibility of punitive state responses.”55 Bridges
concludes that rather than bartering their privacy for benefits, it is
more accurate to state that, in our current socio-political and legal
environment, poor families have no privacy rights to begin within.56
Kaaryn Gustafson’s work on the criminalization of welfare adds
another crucial piece to the framework for understanding the current
administrative modalities of poverty programs.
Gustafson
demonstrates in extraordinary detail that today, “[w]elfare rules
54

Id. at 332-33.
Khiara Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 24 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 114, 131 (2011).
56
Id. at 173.
55
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assume the criminality of the poor . . . [and] the logics of crime control
now reign supreme over efforts to reduce poverty or to ameliorate its
effects.”57 Gustafson provides ample evidence for these claims. The
expanding reach of the criminal justice system is manifested in social
welfare programs in at least two ways: first, in the use of the
mechanisms and modalities of the criminal system within the benefit
application process; and second, in the increasing use of the welfare
system as an extension of law enforcement. Leading the trend toward
rendering the welfare system analogous to the criminal justice system
is the use of biometric imaging technology. In response to a series of
federal studies revealing some instances of receipt of benefits in more
than one jurisdiction by individuals, the 1996 welfare reform law
“required states to institute fraud prevention programs.”58 Several
states instituted a program of biometric imaging in which, in most
cases, applicants’ fingerprints and possibly photographs are scanned
and then run through a variety of state and federal databases,
purportedly to detect instances in which recipients are attempting to
“double dip” by receiving benefits in more than one jurisdiction.59
Even before these systems were in place, instances of welfare fraud in
the form of double dipping were characterized more by infamous
individual instances rather than by any data showing a widespread
practice. Today, given the extensive system of data cross-checking
now in place, these processes are even more unlikely to and in fact do
not actually uncover significant instances of welfare fraud.60 But, as
Gustafson observes, biometric imaging “serves another purpose: the
collection of biometric data scrutinizes and stigmatizes low-income
adults in a way that equates poverty with criminality.”61 In these
states, because of the extensive interviewing, data checks, and finger
57

KAARYN GUSTAFSON, CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY 1 (2011).
58
Id. at 56.
59
Id. at 56-57.
60
For example, in California, the state identifies only three matches per month
and refers only one of these cases per month for more extensive fraud investigation.
Id. at 57. Although policymakers claim that the purpose of these programs is to as
much to deter as to detect fraud, there is also extensive evidence that it deters not
fraud but applications of needy individuals. Id. at 57-58. Policymakers continue to
persist in requiring finger imaging despite extraordinary evidence of its high cost and
low utility in detecting fraud. For example, according to a report evaluating its
effectiveness in Texas, one study found that it failed to reduce caseloads, cost the
taxpayers $15.9 million between its implementation in 1996 and 2000, and, over the
same period, ‘resulted in only nine charges filed by the DA, 10 administrative
penalty cases, and 12 determinations of no fraud.’” Id. at 58 (citations omitted).
61
Id. at 57.
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imaging, “applying for welfare mirrors the experience of being booked
for a crime.”62
In a related trend, it is quite clear that, post 1996, the welfare
system has been employed as yet another tool in criminal law
enforcement. This is manifested in several ways. First, post 1996, law
enforcement officials need merely ask for public benefit records in
order to receive them. Absolutely no legal process is required.63 This
allows law enforcement agencies to use the extensive personal
information held within these databases for investigation and
prosecution of crimes. Beyond this, there have been several instances
in which welfare agencies have collaborated with law enforcement to
apprehend individuals for reasons utterly unrelated to their public
benefits. For example, under a program called Operation Talon, Food
Stamp64 offices collaborate with law enforcement to apprehend
individuals with outstanding warrants. After a computerized match is
run between the relevant databases, individuals receive a pretextual
letter asking them to come in to discuss an issue concerning their
benefits. When they arrive, they are met by law enforcement and
arrested. Between 1996 and September 20, 2009, 14,645 individuals
were arrested under this program.65
This article will argue, in Section IV, that remembering the
fundamental structural divide in U.S. social welfare policy, the
wholesale lack of privacy rights and the remarkable criminalization of
support, with the inextricable ties to racial subordination embedded in
all these trends, is crucial to conceptualizing a path to the supportive
state.
C. From Less Eligibility to Hyperregulation
In 1971, Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward published
62

Id.
Id. at 54 (citing 7 U.S.C. 2020(e)(8) and 42 U.S.C. 1437z).
64
In 2008, the Food Stamp Program was renamed and is now called
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program or SNAP. See Food, Conservation, and
Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §4001(b), 122 Stat. 1651 (2008).
Nevertheless for the purposes of name recognition this article continues to use the
more well-known term “Food Stamp.”
65
Hearing to Review Quality Control Systems in the Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program Before the H. Subcomm on Dep’t Operations, Oversight,
Nutrition, and Forestry of the H. Comm. on Agric., 111th Cong. 28 (2010) (statement
of the Hon. Phyllis K. Fong, Inspector General, U.S. Dep’t of Agric.). For more
information on Operation Talon see GUSTAFSON, supra note 57, at 54.
63
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Regulating the Poor, a ground-breaking treatise that would shift the
way that left scholars talked about U.S. poverty policy. Piven and
Cloward argued that “relief programs are initiated to deal with
dislocation in the work system that lead to mass disorder, and are then
retained . . . to enforce work.”66 Highlighting current manifestations
of the age-old social welfare theory of less eligibility,67 Piven and
Cloward persuasively chronicled the systematic expansion and
contraction of public aid as a mechanism to keep workers vulnerable
and beholden to the vagaries of the low wage labor market. Loïc
Wacquant has recently and persuasively argued, however, that it is no
longer sufficient to analyze the operation of the social welfare state in
isolation. Instead Wacquant and others urge us to widen the frame and
see how both social welfare and criminal justice mechanisms
interweave to control poor communities. As Wacquant frames it,
. . . [T]his cyclical dynamic of expansion and contraction of
public aid has been superseded by a new division of the labor
of nomination and domination of dependent populations that
couples welfare services and criminal justice administration
under the aegis of the same behaviorist and punitive
philosophy. The activation of disciplinary programs applied to
the unemployed, the indigent, single mothers, and others “on
assistance” so as to push them onto the peripheral sectors of the
employment market, on the one side, and the deployment of an
extended police and penal net . . . on the other side, are the two
components of a single apparatus for the management of
poverty that aims at effecting the authoritarian rectification of
the behaviors of populations recalcitrant to the emerging
economic and symbolic order.68
Wacquant thus insists that the U.S. social welfare state operates as one
of two interlocked systems that work together to discipline those who
threaten the neoliberal economic order.69 In his terms, “workfare” and
66

FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE
FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE xvii (updated ed. 1993) (1971).
67
“Less eligibility” describes the principle, long established within social
welfare policy, that any means of support offered to the poor should leave them in
circumstances worse than those they would face if participating in the market. See id.
at 35. For a historical description of this concept, see id. at 35-36.
68
LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF
SOCIAL INSECURITY 14 (2009).
69
Wacquant genders the two systems (penal and social welfare) female and
male respectively. Id. at 14-15. Although this article does not focus on the question
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“prisonfare” are inextricably linked.70 And those disciplined are, of
course, raced black, both actually and as a matter of symbolic
ordering.71
Frank Rudy Cooper recently noted that Wacquant also offers
valuable terminology for describing the targeted nature of these
interlocking systems. Cooper, citing Wacquant, recently argued that
we should use the prefix “hyper” as opposed the descriptor “mass” to
describe the phenomena of incarceration in poor, urban communities
of color in the United States. Cooper notes that the use of the prefix
“hyper”
is not generalized, but targeted . . . .[H]yper-incarceration
should be seen as a multidimensional attack on a specific group
of people. Wacquant reveals that hyper-incarceration has “been
finely targeted, first by class, second by that disguised brand of
ethnicity called race, and third by place.” The class targeted is,
of course, the poor. The races targeted are, of course, blacks
and then Latinos/as. The place targeted is the inner city.72
While Wacquant is referring here to the targeting of penal policies, for
the purposes of this article I use the prefix “hyper” and the term
“hyperregulatory state” to describe a wide ranging set of mechanisms
of the gender of the penal arm as Wacquant describes it, the gendering of the penal
system as male is problematic in its elision of one of the fastest growing incarcerated
populations, poor women of color. For a broad ranging discussion of the implications
of this trend, see the symposium issue recently published by the UCLA Law Review
entitled Overpoliced and Underprotected: Women, Race and Criminalization, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012). As described by Kimberle Crenshaw, whose article
introduces the volume, “[m]ore than simply adding women of color into the mix, this
symposium interrogates the terms by which women are situated both within the
discourse of mass incarceration as well as within various systems that overlap and
that contribute to the vulnerability of racially marginalized women.” Kimberle
Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking Intersectionally
About Women, Race and Social Control. 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418, 1422 (2012).
70
WACQUANT, supra note 68, at 79.
71
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
AN AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (showing that the criminal justice system and
its associated civil feeder and postincarceration classifications systems serve to strip
black communities of their freedom and of the fundamental privileges of citizenship
and to recreate, in Alexander’s terms, a New Jim Crow).
72
Frank Rudy Cooper, Hyper-Incarceration as a Multidimensional Attack:
Replying to Angela Harris Through The Wire, 37 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y. 67, 68-69
(2011) (quoting Loïc Wacquant, Racial Stigma in the Making of America's Punitive
State, in RACE, INCARCERATION, AND AMERICAN VALUES 57, 59 (2008)).
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imbedded primarily in the social welfare state that, like the mechanism
Wacquant describes, are targeted, by race, class, place (and, I add,
gender) to control and subordinate poor communities in general and
poor communities of color in particular.
In addition to widening the frame and defining terms, we also need
to focus sharply on the details of these “structural and institutional
intersections.”73 As Dorothy Roberts’s work continually reminds us,
describing “particular systemic intersection[s] . . . help[s] elucidate
how state mechanisms of surveillance and punishment work to
penalize the most marginalized women in our society.”74 We must, in
short, look at these intersections from the ground up.
In my review of the work of scholars such as Bridges and
Gustafson I have already described some of the mechanisms that could
be described as mechanisms of the hyperregulatory state. The
following section turns to one less-explored piece of this puzzle:
outlining the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality75 as it
manifests when poor people seek assistance from some of the most
basic social support mechanisms that exist in the United States: public
health and welfare. In each example, information that is deemed to
indicate non-compliant and/or deviant conduct travels, from the
original social welfare system into other even more punitive systems.
73

Crenshaw, supra note 69, at 1427. Crenshaw uses the term “structuraldynamic discrimination” to describe “intersections [that] are constituted by a variety
of social forces that situate women of color within contexts structured by various
social hierarchies and that render them disproportionately available to certain
punitive policies and discretionary judgment that dynamically reproduce these
hierarchies.” She uses the term “intersectional subordination” to describe “outcomes
produced in the interface between private institutional configurations such as the
housing market or neighborhood watches and the policing power of state actors.” Id.
74
Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of
Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1476 (2012).
75
Dorothy Roberts uses the term “system intersectionality” to describe how the
policies of the child welfare and criminal justice system work together to perpetuate
the subordination of poor African American women. Roberts, supra note 74. The
focus here is slightly different. While Roberts’ analysis looks at how a variety of
policies, such as incarceration for low level drug offenses and the emphasis on
adoption in the Adoption and Safe Families Act work together to lead to African
American women losing their children, the analysis here looks at a particular kind of
intersections whereby information travels from one regulatory system to another,
resulting in heightened consequences for the person seeking support. In addition the
word regulatory (as opposed to system) calls attention to the focus here on the
myriad of detailed structures that lead to the devastating punitive outcomes described
in Section III. Having said that, however, the terms are clearly closely related.
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It is in large part through the mechanisms of these processes that the
systems work together to impose ever heightening penalties on the
families that seek assistance.76
To understand the impact of regulatory intersectionality (and the
broader concept of the hyperregulatory state) on the theory and path to
realization of a more responsive or supportive state, it is important to
understand both whom these policies impact and how those impacts
shape the perception of the users of the U.S. social welfare system. In
every system described below, be it the social welfare settings (public
health and welfare) or the systems into which data is transmitted and
further punishment imposed (child protection and criminal justice),
these systems disproportionately serve and target poor communities
which are, in turn disproportionately composed of African American
families. Moreover, as other scholars have amply demonstrated, both
the child welfare and the criminal justice systems contribute to the
destruction of poor Black communities and families and the recreation
of a racial caste-like system. This article takes those arguments to be
true.77 However, it is not necessary, for the purposes of this article, to
76

It is important to note that each of these phenomena could be and in some
cases has been studied in more detail than is presented here. For example, Kaaryn S.
Gustafson’s CHEATING WELFARE: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF POVERTY (2011) provides a detailed and extensive description of how welfare
programs are characterized by both assumptions of latent criminality among
recipients and extensive interactions between the welfare and criminal justice
systems. John Gilliom’s OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE
AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (2001) provides an astounding look at the mechanisms
of surveillance and data sharing that dominate public assistance programs and fuel
welfare fraud prosecutions. Similarly, Dorothy Roberts has for many years been
tracing the means by which poor Black women, through the wielding of racial tropes,
the geography of race and poverty and the disproportionate targeting of their
communities, face interlocked public health, child welfare and criminal systems that
expose them to escalating punishments and reinforce the U.S. racial hierarchy. See,
e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE
(2002) [hereinafter ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS]; Roberts, supra note 73; Dorothy
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts,
Punishing Drug Addicts]. The point of this article is not to reproduce these
descriptions and analysis, but rather to build on them and, more specifically, to begin
to draw attention to the pervasive nature of intersectional regulation across social
welfare settings and beyond.
77
The literature on the topic of race and the criminal justice system is extensive.
For a compelling description of the way that mass incarceration and its concomitant
over-policing, targeted prosecution and post-conviction civil consequences operate to
institute a system of racial caste in American society, see ALEXANDER, supra note
71. For a devastating chronicle of the impact of punitive child welfare policies on
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re-prove those well-substantiated claims. Here only two specific
pieces of this larger argument are crucial. First, it is important simply
to understand that the systems at issue affect poor, African American
communities disproportionately. Second, it is important to understand
both the validity and widespread existence of the perception within
poor communities of the child welfare and criminal justice systems as
tools of racial subordination. It is justified perceptions like these and
the mechanisms of heightening punishment described below that make
them important for realizing the supportive state.
Indeed, these
perceptions and realities matter a great deal if we are, as this Article
proposes, to center the experiences of poor African American women
in our analysis of how the state currently operates and how we might
theorize a path from its current operation to a more responsive state.
Below is a brief summary of the data that underlies the claim of
disproportionate representation and disproportionate negative impact.
D. Race, Gender and Poverty in Social Welfare, Child Welfare and
Criminal Justice Settings
In both examples described in Section III, clients enter a particular
social welfare setting: public health and welfare. As a result of that
entrance, the original social welfare system comes to the conclusion
that the person has broken some rule of the system or has engaged in
what actors in the system or system policies define as deviant or
dangerous conduct. In both systems, the conduct leads to some overt
sanction within the social welfare setting: in the example of public
health, an overt deterrence to accessing prenatal care and in the
welfare setting, a denial of benefits.78 The punishment, however, does
not cease with the imposition of those penalties. The information
about that person or that family then travels from that system to
another, resulting in ever-heightening negative consequences for some
or all members of the family. In both examples, the information flows
from the social welfare setting to the child protection agency and, in
some circumstances, to the criminal system. In each of these systems
poor African American children and families, see generally ROBERTS, SHATTERED
BONDS, supra note 76. For a discussion of the way that child welfare and criminal
justice systems work together to devastate black families, see Roberts, supra note 74.
78
In the public health setting, the fact that a pregnant mother tests positive for
drugs does not lead overtly to a sanction within the public health system. For
example, unlike in the welfare context, that mother is not subject to a rule that would
deny her health benefits as a result of that test. Instead, in that setting, the
punishment comes with the transmission of information from the public health to the
child welfare and criminal systems.
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(social welfare, child protection, and criminal justice), poor African
American people are disproportionately represented.
Of the two social welfare settings considered below, one serves, by
definition, only those in poverty.79 Although, under the terms of the
federal Temporary Assistance to Needy Families Program, states have
broad discretion to design their programs, a central purpose of the
program is, “to provide assistance to needy families.”80 In contrast
although the health care facilities that serve pregnant women are by
definition open to all, by virtue of geography and the race and class
stratification of the health care system in the U.S., these setting serve,
disproportionately, poor communities of color.81
Analyzing these systems at their intersections reveals legal
mechanisms that facilitate and, in some cases, mandate the
transmission of information about poor clients from the social welfare
setting into other, even more intrusive and punitive regulatory systems.
In particular, both social welfare settings are structured to facilitate the
transmission of purportedly negative information about clients from
the social welfare setting into the agencies of the child welfare and
criminal justice systems, thereby imposing escalating punitive
consequences on those who seek support. The disproportionate
representation of poor African American men, women and children in
both child welfare and criminal systems and the means by which these
systems work to perpetuate the subordination of poor African
American communities in the U.S. has been extensively and
compellingly chronicled elsewhere.82 Nevertheless, because of the way
79

In using the term poverty, it is crucial to note that those who fall below the
poverty line are very, very poor. The U.S. poverty measure has been widely
criticized as inaccurate and outdated. See Wendy A. Bach, Governance,
Accountability and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 278-79.
80
42 U.S.C. §601(a)(1) (YEAR).
81
See Unequal Outcomes in the United States: Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Health Care Treatment and Access, the Role of Social and Environmental
Determinants of Health, and the Responsibility of the State, CERD WORKING GROUP
ON
HEALTH
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH,
(Jan.
2008),
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/CERDhealthEnvironmentReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 4,
2013).
82
For a concise description of these phenomena as they impact African
American women in particular, see Geneva Brown, The Intersectionality of Race,
Gender and Reentry: Challenges for African American Women, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
SOCIETY
FOR
LAW
AND
POLICY
(Nov.
2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Brown%20issue%20brief%20-%20Intersectionality.pdf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013). On the issue of racial disproportionatity in the criminal
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that regulatory intersectionality facilitates this subordination, it is
important to review these arguments here.
As to the child welfare system, Dorothy Roberts’s seminal work
leaves little doubt that the child welfare system is “a state-run program
that disrupts, restructures, and polices Black families.”83 Her work also
leaves little doubt that “[b]lack families are being systematically
demolished”84 by that system. A few statistics paint this picture
clearly. Although the cause of overrepresentation is disputed, it is
beyond dispute that African American children are far more likely to
be subject to child welfare intervention than are white children85 and
that poor children, who are disproportionately African American, are
also far more likely to be subject to intervention than children who are
not poor.86 For example, in 2008, while African American children
were only 14% of the total population, they were 31% of the
percentage of children in foster care.87 It is also beyond dispute that
African American children and African American families fare far
worse than their white counterparts once they come to the attention of
child welfare authorities. As Roberts systematically chronicles in
Shattered Bonds, black children are more likely to be separated from
their parents, spend more time in foster care, and are receive inferior
services.88
Although it is difficult to capture the extraordinary
presence of child protection agencies in the lives of poor Black
families today, the fact that “[o]ne out of twenty two Black children in
New York City is in foster care” and, “one out ten children [in the low
income neighborhoods of Central Harlem is] . . . in foster care”89 gives
some sense of the incredible depth of this presence and its impact on
these communities.
As to the criminal justice system, although many have long
documented the extraordinary negative impact of the War on Drugs
and hyper-incarceration on poor African American communities,
justice system see ALEXANDER, supra note 71.
83
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 76, at viii.
84
Id. (emphasis omitted).
85
Child Welfare Information Gateway, Addressing Racial Disproportionality in
Child Welfare, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 3 tbl. 2 (Jan. 2011),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue_briefs/racial_disproportionality/racial_disp
roportionality.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
86
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 120-21.
87
Id. at 3.
88
ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 76, at 9.
89
Id. at 9.
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Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow has captured public
imagination on this issue as perhaps no other work has before it.
Paralleling Roberts’s work on the way that the child welfare system
targets African American communities, Alexander persuasively argues
that the criminal justice system writ large (including the full gamut of
systems from over-policing in poor African American neighborhoods,
through prosecution and plea bargaining, incarceration and postconviction collateral consequences),
. . . creates and maintains racial hierarchy much as earlier
system of control did. Like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass
incarceration operates as a tightly networked system of laws,
policies, customs, and institutions that operate collectively to
ensure the subordinate status of a group defined largely by
race.90
It is in part through the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality that
the social welfare systems described below feed negative information
about poor women and children out of the already punitive social
welfare setting into these even more harmful and punitive systems.
III. Regulatory Intersectionality
To examine in detail the interactions (or intersections) between
social welfare systems and even more punitive systems, this article
focuses on two specific examples. In the first example pregnant
women seeking prenatal care find themselves and their children
subject to often coerced or non-consensual drug testing and, as a result
of that testing, find themselves subject to child welfare and criminal
justice interventions. In the second setting, welfare applicants are
subject to drug testing as a condition of receiving public benefits and,
as the analysis shows, not only risk non-receipt of subsistence level
benefits but are also vulnerable to child welfare and criminal
interventions. These examples are highlighted in detail here because
of the relative ease of tracing the legal and structural mechanisms that
facilitate this process. Having said that it is clear that the phenomena
of intersecting systems that escalate punishment in poor communities
is broader than these two examples. For example, public housing
residents are subject to extraordinary surveillance, which can lead not
only to eviction, but also to criminal prosecution. Similarly, the close
and continuous interactions between schools and the juvenile justice
90

ALEXANDER, supra note 71, at 13.

Forthcoming Yale Journal of Law and Feminism Volume 25:2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383908

The Hyperregulatory State

29

system that make up the school to prison pipeline could also be
described and examined through this lens. Because of the specificity
with which one can trace the intersecting regulatory systems, the two
examples provide a particularly clear sense of the legal and regulatory
mechanisms that facilitate escalating punishment.
A. Seeking Prenatal and Pregnancy Care in Public Health Facilities:
Drug Testing, Child Protection Interventions and Criminal
Prosecutions.
Poor women seeking health care during the course of pregnancy
face a set of systems that quite clearly demonstrate the phenomena of
regulatory intersectionality. The program at the center of the 2001
Supreme Court decision in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,91 provides
an apt example.
In Ferguson, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a drug testing program established by a task force
of police and public hospital employees in Charleston, South Carolina.
Under the program, women who sought prenatal care and/or gave birth
at a particular state hospital were drug tested without their knowledge
or consent if they met one of nine specified, facially race- and classneutral criteria.92 If a woman tested positive for cocaine she was
subject to prosecution for crimes such as simple possession of a
controlled substance, unlawful distribution to a minor, and
endangering the welfare of a child.93 Over the course of its
implementation, the program took on various forms, sometimes
offering the women a chance to avoid prosecution if they enrolled in
treatment programs and sometimes not.94 Ten women, who received
care at the public hospital, were subject to the drug tests, and were
subsequently prosecuted, challenged the program on the basis that it
violated their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that
the tests were in fact searches under the Fourth Amendment,95 and that
they violated the, “general prohibition against nonconsensual,
91

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). For a related discussion
of Ferguson in the context of class and poverty, see Michele Estrin Gilman, The
Class Differential in Poverty Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1427-40 (2012).
92
Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71 (the nine criteria were no prenatal care, late prenatal
care after 24 weeks gestation, incomplete prenatal care, abruptio placentae,
intrauterine fetal death, preterm labor of no obvious cause, intrauterine growth
retardation of no obvious cause, previously known drug or alcohol abuse, and
unexplained congenital abnormalities).
93
Id. at 72-73.
94
Id. at 72.
95
Id. at 76.
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warrantless, and suspicionless searches.”96
It may be true that the program at issue in Ferguson was a product
of the much hyped phenomena of “crack babies”97 and was perhaps, in
the overt and targeted nature of the collaboration between the police
and hospital, sui generis. Nevertheless, across the country today, the
statutory and regulatory frameworks that govern confidentiality of
health information, child protection agencies, and criminal justice
agencies provide ample opportunities to facilitate the gathering and
transmission of data about drug use by pregnant women out of the
public health setting and into child welfare and criminal systems.
Moreover, despite some of the protections embedded in the laws
governing the conduct of health care providers, significant research
indicates that information often flows from the public health setting
into the child welfare and criminal justice setting despite the law.
These intersecting regulatory systems thus provide a clear example, in
a quite generic social welfare setting, of regulatory intersectionality.
1. Drug Testing: The Basic Legal Framework
Although drug testing in a variety of contexts is becoming
increasingly commonplace,98 when looking particularly at the drug
testing of pregnant women in a health care setting, it is crucial to
remember that, except in a very narrow circumstances, information
obtained by health professionals in the course of providing medical
care must be kept confidential and can only be disclosed with the
patient’s consent.99 In addition, as noted by the Supreme Court in
Ferguson, “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the
typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the
96

Id. at 86.
See infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
98
See, e.g., Craig M. Cornish & Donald B. Louria, Mass Drug Testing: The
Hidden Long-Term Costs, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 95, 95 (1991) (“Widespread
drug testing in the American workplace began with President Ronald Reagan’s
enactment of Executive Order 12,564[.]”); Mary Pilon, Drug-Testing Company Tied
to N.C.A.A. Stirs Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at SP1 (discussing the
proliferation of drug testing in professional and collegiate sports); Mary Pilon,
Middle Schools Add a Team Rule: Get a Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at
A1 (discussing middle schools that now test for drugs).
99
See, e.g., American Medical Association, Patient Confidentiality,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/legal-topics/patientphysician-relationship-topics/patient-confidentiality.page (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
97
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results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel
without her consent.”100 Finally, as the Supreme Court noted in
Ferguson, unlike in the welfare setting or in an employment setting, a
pregnant woman seeking health care in a public health setting is not
seeking some benefit a condition of which is passing a drug test.101
The woman is seeking medical care, the quality of which has always
depended on a relationship of trust between doctors and patients.102
In the context of drug testing pregnant women, these basic rules of
law are complicated by a variety of factors. First, in the vast majority
of circumstances, once a pregnant woman goes to a hospital to give
birth and signs a generalized consent form, health care professionals
can legally order virtually any medical test that they believe to be
medically indicated to diagnose and treat the patient.103 Second, in the
context of pregnancy and childbirth, there are valid medical concerns
100

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78.
In discussing the constitutionality of the search at issue in Ferguson, the
Court distinguished the Ferguson facts from the four previous settings in which the
Court had ruled on the issue of whether a drug test violated the Fourth Amendment.
The four cases involved “. . .drug tests for railway employees involved in train
accidents, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 109 S.Ct.
1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), for United States Customs Service employees
seeking promotion to certain sensitive positions, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989), and for high school students
participating in interscholastic sports, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S.
646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995). . . [and] . . . for candidates for
designated state offices. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137
L.Ed.2d 513 (1997).” Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77. As the Court explained, in those
cases, “there was no misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential
use of the test results, and there were protections against the dissemination of the
results to third parties. The use of an adverse test result to disqualify one from
eligibility for a particular benefit, such as a promotion or an opportunity to
participate in an extracurricular activity, involves a less serious intrusion on privacy
than the unauthorized dissemination of such results to third parties.” Id. at 77-78.
102
For a discussion of the effect of mandatory reporting laws, on patient trust
see Ellen M. Weber, Child Welfare Interventions for Drug-Dependent Pregnant
Women: Limitation of a Non-Public Health Response, 75 UMKC L REV. 789, 805
(2006).
103
See infra note 117 and accompanying text: Elizabeth A. Warner, MD, Robert
M. Walker, MD & Peter D. Friedmann, MD, MPH, Should Informed Consent be
Required for Laboratory Testing for Drugs of Abuse in Medical Settings?, 115-1
AM. J. OF MEDICINE, 55 (2003) (footnote omitted) (“Currently, explicit informed
consent is not required for clinical drug testing. In many cases, such as trauma or
overdose, explicit consent is not possible. However, even when substance abuse is
suspected and the patient is able to provide consent, clinicians often order drug
testing without the patient’s knowledge and consent.”).
101
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for the health of both the mother and the fetus during pregnancy and
the child after birth, and it is certainly possible that those interests may
diverge during the course of treatment. Another complicating factor
has to do with laws concerning the reporting of suspected child abuse.
Health professionals are, in the vast majority of jurisdictions,
mandatory reporters.104 Although child abuse reporting laws vary
significantly by state,105 it is always true that health care professionals
who see evidence of abuse or neglect have a duty to report that to child
protection agencies.106 Finally, in every state, child abuse is crime.107
These final two facts bear repeating and emphasis. In virtually
every jurisdiction, health care professionals are under a duty to report
suspected abuse. And in every jurisdiction people can be prosecuted
for various crimes associated with child abuse. Given this long
standing, pre-existing legal background, arguably we need no other
law or regulatory schema in place either to create a duty to report or
for prosecutors to have the authority to prosecute. In light of this, the
extensive elaborations of these duties as well as the remarkable legal
contortions engaged in by prosecutors and some appellate courts to
allow for criminal prosecution in these circumstances108 constitute a
set of legal mechanisms to put society’s finger on the scale in favor of
child protection and criminal interventions and against the health care
and privacy interests of the women involved. Thus, in this example,
the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality serve to facilitate the
imposition of escalating punishment on the poor, disproportionately
African American women who seek assistance and find themselves
subject to these intersecting regulatory systems. This finger on the
scale is part and parcel of the hyperregulatory state.
2. Drug Testing of Pregnant Women and Their Children: The Legal
Framework and Hospital Practice
Despite the basic legal framework concerning patient autonomy
and informed consent, a combination of legal rules and medical
practices make it nearly impossible for some pregnant women to both
obtain care and avoid drug testing. Moreover, as discussed extensively
104

See supra note 216.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Child Welfare Information Gateway, Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect,
http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2013).
108
See infra notes 161-164 and accompanying text.
105
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below, the discretionary framework established around drug testing
leads to disproportionate punitive impacts on poor African American
women.109
In two states, Iowa110 and Kentucky,111 health care providers are
authorized by statute to test women and/or infants for exposure to
controlled substances without informed consent. The Iowa provision
states:
If a health practitioner discovers in a child physical or
behavioral symptoms of the effects of exposure to cocaine,
heroin, amphetamine, methamphetamine, or other illegal drugs,
or combinations or derivatives thereof, which were not
prescribed by a health practitioner, or if the health practitioner
has determined through examination of the natural mother of
the child that the child was exposed in utero, the health
practitioner may perform or cause to be performed a medically
relevant test. . . on the child.112
Minnesota and Louisiana113 go even further, mandating, as opposed to
authorizing, a test on certain newborns. The Minnesota statue
provides that:
[a] physician shall administer to each newborn infant born
under the physician’s care a toxicology test to determine
whether there is evidence of prenatal exposure to a controlled
substance, if the physician has reason to believe based on a
medical assessment of the mother or the infant, that the mother
used a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose during
the pregnancy.114

109

See infra notes 173-184 and accompanying text.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77.
111
KY. REV. STAT. ANN § 214.160.
112
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77 (West 2014) (emphasis added).
113
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN art. 610.
114
MINN. STAT. ANN §626.5562 (emphasis added). Minnesota law mandates
testing of pregnant women pursuant to similar rules. Pursuant to the same statutory
provision, “A physician shall administer a toxicology test to a pregnant woman under
the physician’s care or to a woman under the physician’s care within 8 hours after
delivery to determine whether there is evidence that she has ingested a controlled
substance, if the woman has obstetrical complications that are a medical indication of
possible use of a controlled substance for a nonmedical purpose.” Id.
110
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Although one might assume, from the lack of legislation
authorizing testing without consent in the vast majority of states, that
in most circumstances newborns are not tested without the mother’s
consent, in practice there is evidence to suggest that hospitals either
routinely test without explicit consent or use the threat of child
protective interventions as a means to pressure women to consent.115
When a pregnant woman goes to a hospital to give birth, she is
generally asked to sign a generalized consent form giving health care
providers authorization to treat both the mother and the eventual
newborn child. Although best practices developed in the field of
obstetrical care suggest that no test should be run on a pregnant
woman without explicit consent to that test,116 there is substantial
evidence to suggest that hospitals routinely test pregnant women
without their consent. In addition, although the law continues to
require informed consent, protocols are set at the hospital level.117
Crucial decisions, including for example whether a general consent to
testing includes drug testing or requires specific consent to that test,
are left to hospitals to determine.118
Despite legal mandates and best practice suggestions, it appears
that both pregnant women and their newborn children are often tested
without notice or consent. A study funded by the Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation as part of the Substance Abuse Policy Research
Program and conducted at the National Abandoned Infants Assistance
115

See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and
American Academy of Pediatrics, Model Informed Consent: Screening and Testing
for Controlled or Addictive Substances in Pregnancy (on file with author).
117
Krista Drescher-Burke and Amy Price, Identifying, Reporting and
Responding to Substance Exposed Newborns: An Exploratory Study of Policies and
Practices, Berkeley, CA: The National Abandoned Infants Assistance Resource
Center (2005), http://aia.berkeley.edu/media/pdf/rwj_report.pdf; Kathryn Wells,
Substance Abuse and Child Maltreatment, 56 PEDIATRIC CLIN. N. AM 345, 356
(2009) (stating, in a discussion of best practices protocols for using drug testing as a
part screening newborns who may have been exposed to drugs, that, “[d]epending on
a hospital’s policy, consent may need to be obtained prior to testing the mother or
infant.”).
118
A 2009 guideline issued by the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center,
Guidelines for Care of the Known or Suspected Drug (Illicit Substance) Exposed
Newborn, provides an example of such a policy. Under this guideline, “[p]arental
permission is not required for newborn drug screening, but is recommended. The
care agreement signed on admission serves as consent to testing.” DartmouthHitchcock Medical Center, Guidelines for Care of the Known or Suspected Drug
(Illicit Substance) Exposed Newborn (on file with author).
116
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Resource Center at Berkeley119 examined a variety of laws, policies
and practices across eight large urban areas in 2005. The study
authors, Krista Drescher-Burke and Amy Price, surveyed public and
private hospital personnel in each of the eight cities and interviewed
hospital personnel on a variety of topics.120 Hospital staff were asked
questions about notification and consent for drug testing of both
mothers and newborns. As to informed consent for the testing of the
mother, 87% of hospital respondents told the researchers that the
mother would be informed about her own test and 83% told them that
the mother would be informed about a test of her child. As, to
consent, however the data was quite different.
. . . [O]f the 34 hospital employees who responded, 41% stated
that consent is not required for mothers to be tested, 41%
reported that specific consent is required, and 18% reported
that consent is included in the hospital’s general admission
consent. In contrast, a greater number reported that consent is
not required for the newborn to be tested: 66% of the
respondents indicated that consent is not required for the
newborn to be tested; 23% reported that consent is not required
for the newborn if the test is medically necessary, and 11%
noted that the consent to test the newborn is included in the
hospital’s general consent. It is important to note that no
respondents reported that a mother’s consent is explicitly
required to test a newborn.121
Moreover, while some hospitals clearly do discuss drug testing of
both mothers and newborns with their patients, in practice women face
substantial risks for failing to consent. For example, internal
guidelines issued by the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in New
Hampshire specify that, if a parent refuses drug screening for their
infant, the need for the test is documented in that mother’s medical
record and “[t]he parent’s refusal of drug screening is reported to the
state Child Protective Services . . . as being potentially ‘neglectful.’”122
119

Drescher-Burke and Price, supra note 117.
The study authors were ultimately able to interview staff from 29 hospitals
across the eight cities studied. These included 10 public and 4 private for-profit and
12 private non-profit hospitals. They conducted a total of 39 interviews of hospital
staff. Id.at 6. Presumably to preserve the anonymity of their research subjects, the
report does not reveal the names of the urban areas studied.
121
Drescher-Burke and Price, supra note 117, at 9.
122
Guidelines for Care of the Known or Suspected Drug (Illicit Substance)
Exposed Newborn, supra note 118 (alteration in original).
120
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The American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology Model Informed
Consent Form indicates concurrence with such policies. In this model
form the pregnant woman, while clearly being given the right to refuse
a drug test for herself, is told,
If you do not agree to testing when it is recommend by your
doctor or midwife, it may result in your baby being tested after
birth if the baby’s medical provider has reason to be medically
concerned for the baby’s health. If you newborn is tested and
the test results are positive for addictive substances
(drugs/alcohol), [Child Protective Services] will be notified.123
Thus for all intents and purposes, pregnant women who enter into a
hospital setting at birth and who, for whatever reason, are determined
to have potentially exposed their fetuses to controlled substances, have
little means to avoid drug testing.
3. The consequence within the initial social welfare system that
results from the information
A variety of researchers agree that the cultural hysteria around
drug addicted newborns, both at the height of the “crack baby” scares
in the mid 1980s and today misconstrue the complex relationship
between drug use and the health of children exposed in utero to
controlled substances.124 For example, as Lynn Paltrow and Jeanne
Flavin have noted, the U.S. Sentencing Commission concluded that,
“‘[t]he negative effects of prenatal cocaine exposure are significantly
less severe than previous believed’ and those negative effects ‘do not
differ from the effects of prenatal exposure to other drugs, both legal
and illegal.’”125
Nevertheless, it is certainly true in some
circumstances that the mother’s addiction so dominates her choices
that it is appropriate to remove her child temporarily or permanently
123

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and American
Academy of Pediatrics, Model Informed Consent: Screening and Testing for
Controlled or Addictive Substances in Pregnancy (on file with author).
124
See, e.g., Jeanne Flavin & Lynn M. Paltrow, Punishing Pregnant Drug-Using
Women: Defying Law, Medicine, and Common Sense, 29 J. OF ADDICTIVE DISEASES
231, 232 (2010).
125
Id. at 233 (quoting U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress:
Cocaine
and
Federal
Sentencing
Policy,
21-22
(2002),
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and
_Reports/Drug_Topics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/ch3.pdf)
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2013)).
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from her care. In addition it is certainly true that, were appropriate,
respectful, comprehensive and affordable services available to support
women in facing addiction and in addressing the poverty related
conditions that make it hard to parent when one is poor, referring
women to treatment and support services might make a great deal of
sense. But what does not make sense, and what is manifest in the
systems described below, is a focus not on genuine support but on the
facilitation of punishment that far too often leads to devastating
consequences for both the parent and the child.
There is no question that the possibility that a drug addicted
pregnant woman will be tested and, as detailed below, face both
intervention by child welfare agencies and prosecution, has significant
negative consequences for both the woman and the child in terms of
their access to quality health services.126 First, and most importantly,
punitive policies deter pregnant women from seeking care both for
their addition and for their pregnancy. As detailed below, South
Carolina has consistently wielded the mechanisms of the child welfare
and criminal justice systems against pregnant women. The apparent
results for the utilization of drug treatment are disturbing. In the year
following a decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court to treat a
viable fetus as a “child” for the purposes South Carolina’s child abuse
and endangerment statute,127 “drug treatment programs in the state
experienced as much as an 80% decline in admission of pregnant
women.”128
In addition, as noted by Seema Mohaptra in her article advocating
public health as opposed to criminal responses to drug use during
pregnancy, organizations as wide ranging and respected as the
American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the
126

This is not to suggest that there may not also be substantial positive
consequences if the mother and child receive appropriate support and care to address
the addiction as well as any underlying causes of the addiction. There is, however
strong evidence to indicate that these services do not exist. For example, there is a
shocking lack of drug treatment program available to serve pregnant women. See
Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law By Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on
Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 NYU REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381,
383 (2008).
127
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997).
128
Cynthia Dailard & Elizabeth Nash, State Responses to Substance abuse
among Pregnant Women, THE GUTMACHER INSTITUTE (2000), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/03/6/gr030603.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2013).
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American Public Health Association have raised serious concerns that
the emphasis on punitive responses to drug use during pregnancy
results in less utilization of vital prenatal care. 129 This is of particular
concern for poor women of color. Women in poverty already face
substantial barriers to accessing comprehensive prenatal care.130 For
example, the Medicaid program, which provides health care coverage
to poor pregnant women, varies significantly by state in terms of the
income guidelines, excluding a significant portion of poor pregnant
women.131 In addition depending on the State, prenatal care can be
limited. For example, in contravention of best practices in the field of
obstetrical care, many states do not provide coverage until several
weeks into a pregnancy.132 Given the importance of prenatal care to
maternal and child health, creating an additional substantial
disincentive to access care has clear negative impacts on both women
and children.
4. Pregnancy and Childbirth At The Intersections: Intervention by
Child Protective Agencies
Despite the emphasis within the healthcare profession on patient
confidentiality, state and federal law, as well as widespread practice,
facilitate the transfer of information out of the public health system
129

Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to
Drug Use During Pregnancy, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 241, 254-55 (2011)
(citing Am. Med. Ass’n Bd. of Trustees, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2663, 2667 (1990); Comm. on Substance Abuse, Am. Acad. of
Pediatrics, Drug Exposed Infants, 86 PEDIATRICS 639, 641 (1990); Am. Pub. Health
Ass'n, Illicit Drug Use by Pregnant Women, Policy Statement No. 9020, 8 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 240 (1990); Comm. on Ethics, Am. College of Obstetrics &
Gynecology, Committee Opinion 321 Maternal Decision Making, Ethics and the
Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127 (2005)).
130
See, e.g,. Barbara M. Aved, Mary M Irwin, Lesley S. Cummings & Nancy
Findeisen, Barriers to Prenatal Care for Low-Income Women, 158 WESTERN J. OF
MED. 493 (1993).
131
Tara Culp-Ressler & Adam Peck, Without Obamacare, Families Making
Under $5,000 Aren’t Poor Enough for Medicaid in Some States, THINK PROGRESS
(Aug.
15,
2012,
9:30
AM),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2012/08/15/690761/without-obamacare-familiesmaking-under-5000-arent-poor-enough-for-medicaid-in-some-states/ (“In five states
— Alabama, Arkansas, Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas — a family of three with an
annual income over $5,000 makes too much money to receive any Medicaid
assistance.”).
132
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE COMM. TO STUDY OUTREACH FOR PRENATAL CARE,
PRENATAL CARE: REACHING MOTHERS, REACHING INFANTS 59 (Sarah S. Brown ed.,
1988).
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and into the child protection and criminal justice systems. On the
federal level, the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act
(“CAPTA”) provides a significant amount of funding to state child
welfare programs.133 In order to participate in the program and receive
federal funds each state must submit a plan for the administration of its
CAPTA program that complies with a variety of federal
requirements.134 Among other conditions, states must put in place
policies and procedures to address the needs of infants “born with and
identified as being affected by illegal substance abuse . . . including a
requirement that health care providers involved in the delivery or care
of such infants notify the child protective services system of the
occurrence of such condition in such infants.”135
State law varies significantly both in how health care providers are
to identify substance abuse and the criteria they are to use in making a
determination about whether to report suspected abuse. In addition,
there is some evidence to suggest that, as was the case for drug testing,
despite variations in state law, hospital practices lean strongly toward
reporting women to child protection agencies whenever a drug test
comes back positive.
i. State Statutory Standards for Reporting and Defining Abuse
State law varies significantly on the question of when a health care
practitioner can and must make a report to a child protection agency.
These reporting laws tend to vary along two basic questions: whether
a positive test result itself is enough and whether the report is
voluntary or mandatory. Three states (Missouri,136 Illinois,137 and
Kentucky138) allow but do not require referral. Six states (Alaska,139
Maine140,
Massachusetts,141
Montana,142
Nevada143
and
133

Administration for Children and Families, Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act State Grants, Children’s Bureau, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, available at www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/resource/capta-state-grants (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013). www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/resource/capta-state-grants
134
42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(1) (YEAR). This requirement was added to CAPTA
in 2003 as a result of the Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-36.
135
42 U.S.C.A. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(ii).
136
MO. REV. STAT § 191.737 (West 2013).
137
325 ILL. COMP. STAT. Ch.5/7.3b (West 2013).
138
KY. REV STAT. ANN § 214.160(3) (West 2013).
139
ALASKA STAT ANN § 47.17.024(a) (West 2013).
140
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22 § 4011-B(1) (West 2013).
141
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 §51A(a) (West 2013).
142
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-201(3) (West 2013).
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Pennsylvania144) require reporting upon evidence of something more
than just a positive toxicology report. In those states, providers must
refer upon a determination that the child is in some way, “adversely
affected by a controlled substance.”145 In seven states (Arizona,146
Iowa,147 Louisiana,148 Michigan,149 Minnesota,150 Oklahoma,151 and
South Carolina152), the referral is required based solely on the positive
toxicology report. It is important to keep in mind that, as is often the
case with occasional alcohol use during pregnancy, a positive
toxicology report does not necessarily mean any harm has occurred.153
Despite this, in the aforementioned states, any positive toxicology
screen leads to a referral to the child protection agency. Finally, four
states (South Carolina,154 Colorado,155 Maryland,156 and Wisconsin157)
legislate not just in the area of when a report should be made but in
addition by defining certain acts as abuse per se and allowing for the
detention of a child without a court order. For example, in Colorado,
a child can be detained without a court order, “when a newborn child
is identified . . . as being affected by substance abuse . . . .”158 The
South Carolina statute is without question the most aggressive. That
statute creates a presumption, “that a newborn child is an abused or
neglected child . . . and that the child cannot be protected from further
harm without being removed from the custody of the mother” if the
infant or mother tests positive for a non-prescribed controlled
substance or if the mother or any child she gave birth to in the past
tested positive for a controlled substance.159
143

NEV. REV. STAT ANN. § 432B.220(3) (West 2011).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6386 (West 2013).
145
Supra note 137.
146
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-3620(E) (West 2013).
147
IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.77(2) (West 2013).
148
LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 610 (2012).
149
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623a (2013).
150
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5561(1) (West 2013).
151
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, §1-2-101(B)(2) (West 2013).
152
S.C. CODE ANN. §63-7-1660(F)(1) (West 2012).
153
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
154
Supra note 150.
155
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §19-3-401(3)(b-c) (West 2013).
156
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-818 (West 2013).
157
WIS. STAT ANN §48.02(1) (West 2013).
158
Supra note 153 at (c)(I).
159
Supra note 150. In full, the statutory provision provides that, “[i]t is
presumed that a newborn child is an abused or neglected child as defined in Section
63-7-20 and that the child cannot be protected from further harm without being
removed from the custody of the mother upon proof that:
(a) a blood or urine test of the child at birth or a blood or urine test of the mother at
144
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ii. Reporting in Practice
Despite the significant variation in state law described above, and
the clear suggestion in several states that reporting requires some
evidence of abuse beyond just a positive toxicology report, in practice,
it takes no more than that to result in a report of the child to the child
welfare agency. As noted above, The Drescher-Burke and Price study
of policies and procedures concerning substance exposed newborns in
eight urban centers revealed that, “[r]egardless of the state’s laws,
most (87%) of the 39 respondents indicated that all identified
[substance exposed newborns] are reported to [child protective
services]. A positive toxicology test alone appears to trigger a report
in most cases.”160 This was true across jurisdictions and despite
significant variations in state law.
5. Pregnancy and Childbirth At The Intersections: Intervention by
the Criminal Justice System
The use of the criminal justice system to punish women for
exposing their unborn children to controlled substances is among the
most disturbing examples of the way regulatory intersectionality
facilitates escalating punishment. To date no state has successfully
passed legislation explicitly criminalizing the transmission of drugs in
utero. Despite this lack of explicit legislation, prosecutors have
attempted to contort existing criminal laws to include drug use during
pregnancy by charging women with crimes such as felony
endangerment, criminal child neglect, delivering drugs to a minor,
assault, and homicide.161 In those prosecutions, as a general matter,
prosecutors charge women with crimes against a child or person and
then seek to prove that the fetus at issue is a child or person as
birth shows the presence of any amount of a controlled substance or a metabolite of a
controlled substance unless the presence of the substance or the metabolite is the
result of medical treatment administered to the mother of the infant or the infant, or
(b) the child has a medical diagnosis of fetal alcohol syndrome; and
(c) a blood or urine test of another child of the mother or a blood or urine test of the
mother at the birth of another child showed the presence of any amount of a
controlled substance or a metabolite of a controlled substance unless the presence of
the substance or the metabolite was the result of medical treatment administered to
the mother of the infant or the infant, or
(d) another child of the mother has the medical diagnosis of fetal alcohol
syndrome.”
160
Drescher-Burke & Price, supra note 117, at 9.
161
Mohapatra, supra note 129, at 248-52; Flavin & Paltrow, supra note 124, at
233.
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contemplated by the statute. While these prosecutions have clearly led
to punishment through plea negotiations,162 they generally fail when
fully litigated. With only two exceptions,163 every appellate court to
consider the issue has overturned these convictions as falling outside
the conduct contemplated by these statutes.164 Despite the lack of
explicit legislation and the spate of negative court decisions, hundreds
of women have been charged with criminal offenses arising from their
drug use during pregnancy.
The most comprehensive study to date on state actions in which, “a
woman’s pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and
actual deprivations of the woman’s physical liberty” was conducted by
Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin.165 Paltrow and Flavin
comprehensively reviewed 413 cases that took place between 1973
and 2005, 354 of which involved “. . . efforts to deprive pregnant
women of their liberty . . . through the use of existing criminal statutes
intended for other purposes.”166
162

For examples of cases resulting in punishment through plea negotiations, see
Lynn M. Paltrow and Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications Women’s Legal
Status and Public Health 39 JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLITICS, POLICY AND THE LAW,
299, 306 (2013).
163
In Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997), the South Carolina Supreme
Court upheld the prosecution of Cornelia Whitner for criminal child neglect. Ms.
Whitner’s soon was born in good health but tested positive for cocaine at birth. The
Court held that the fetus is a viable “person” for the purposes of the criminal child
neglect statute and upheld her conviction. To date this appears to be the only case
that has so held. See also Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748, 1 (2013) (holding
that the term “child” found within Alabama’s child endangerment statute includes a
fetus).
164
Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748 at 17 (2013). For cases so holding see,
e.g., Cochran v. Kentucky, 315 S.W.3d 325 (Ky. 2010) (holding that an indictment
charging a woman for first-degree wanton endangerment based on her ingestion of
illegal drugs during pregnancy was invalid on its face); State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d
1210 (Haw. 2005) (holding that a mother who smoked crystal meth, leading to the
death of her as-of-then unborn son, could not be prosecuted for manslaughter); State
v. Cervantes, 223 P.3d 425 (Or. App. 2009) (holding that ingesting drugs during
pregnancy was not reckless endangerment); Ex parte Perales, 215 S.W.3d 418 (Tx.
App. 2007) (holding that a controlled substance entering a child through the
umbilical cord is not the “knowing delivery” of that substance to the child).
165
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 162, at 299. See also Flavin & Paltrow, supra
note 124, at 233 (“National Advocates for Pregnant Women has … documented
hundreds of known cases in at least 40 states where pregnant women who are
identifed as drug users have been arrested.”).
166
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 162, at 321. In addition to prosecutions, the
413 cases included other forms of forced detention including detentions in hospitals,
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i. The Mechanisms of Reporting: From the Health Care Setting to
Child Welfare and Law Enforcement
Despite the prevailing weight of judicial opinions holding that
these prosecutions are not lawful, in January of 2013, the Alabama
Supreme Court held in Ex parte Ankrom167 that the term “child” found
within Alabama’s child endangerment statute included a fetus. In so
holding the court upheld the convictions of Hope Ankrom and
Amanda Kimbrough based on their use of controlled substances during
their pregnancies. This case, like its counterpart in South Carolina,
raises a whole host of concerns related to reproductive justice. For the
purposes of this article however, what is striking is the way that the
facts in both prosecutions demonstrate the phenomena of regulatory
intersectionality. In the Ankrom case the parties stipulated to the
following facts:
On January 31, 2009, the defendant, Hope Ankrom, gave birth
to a son, [B.W.], at Medical Center Enterprise. Medical records
showed that the defendant tested positive for cocaine prior to
giving birth and that the child tested positive for cocaine after
birth. . . . Department of Human Resources worker Ashley
Arnold became involved and developed a plan for the care of
the child. During the investigation the defendant admitted to
Ashley that she had used marijuana while she was pregnant but
denied using cocaine. Medical records from her doctor show
that . . . she had tested positive for cocaine and marijuana on
more than one occasion during her pregnancy.168
Thus in this case the prosecution was facilitated first by the drug tests
conducted by her health care providers both during and after the
pregnancy, the referral to child protective services, the collection of
information by health care and child protective service staff and the
subsequent use of that information to facilitate the prosecution of Ms.
Ankrom. The facts in Ms. Kimbrough’s prosecution reveal the same
set of intersecting regulatory mechanisms. As recited by the Alabama
mental institutions, and treatment programs, as well as forced medical interventions
such as surgery. Id. at 301. The study argues persuasively that, due to the
extraordinary difficulty in obtaining data about these forced interventions and
prosecutions, this figure represents a substantial undercount of those subject to
prosecution for crimes involving their pregnancies. Id. at 303-05.
167
2011 WL 3781258, 1.
168
Id.
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Supreme Court, in Ms. Kimbrough’s case,
The Colbert County Department of Human Resources (‘DHR’)
was notified regarding Kimbrough’s testing positive for
methamphetamine and Timmy’s death, and Kimbrough’s other
two children were temporarily removed from her home and
placed with Kimbrough’s mother. A DHR social worker spoke
with Kimbrough regarding a safety plan for her children on two
occasions. During one of those conversations, Kimbrough
admitted that she had smoked methamphetamine with a friend
three days before she had experienced labor pains. In July
2008, after having determined that the children would be safe
in Kimbrough’s home, DHR returned Kimbrough’s children to
her custody.169
Thus in Kimbrough’s case too the information about the drug use
started with the healthcare system, was transmitted to the child
protection agency and was ultimately crucial to support the
prosecution. Kimbrough’s facts are particularly striking in the
ostensibly benevolent purpose of the conversation between Kimbrough
and the child protection worker. According to the court, the child
protection agency held out that they were interviewing Kimbrough for
the purpose of creating a “safety plan” for her family. It was during
those conversations that she admitted to the drug use during her
pregnancy. Moreover, the agency ultimately concluded that her home
was safe for her two other children, and those children were returned
to her care. Despite this, however, the admission of drug use by
Kimbrough was ultimately utilized not to facilitate the safety of her
children but to prosecute Ms. Kimbrough and sentence her to the
mandatory statutory minimum penalty: ten years in prison.
Paltrow and Flavin’s recent study confirms that the pattern
revealed in the In Re Anrkom is characteristic of the mechanisms of
regulatory intersectionality.
Paltrow and Flavin traced the,
“mechanisms by which the case came to the attention of police,
prosecutors and courts.”170 In 112 of the 413 cases, disclosure came
from “health care, drug treatment or social work professionals.” In 47
cases, “health care and hospital-based social work professionals
disclosed confidential information about pregnant women to child
welfare or social service authorities, who in turn reported the case to
169
170

Ex parte Ankrom, 2013 WL 135748, 4 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 162, at 326.
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the police.171 As they describe it, “[f]ar from being a bulwark against
outside intrusion and protecting patient privacy and confidentiality, we
find that health care and other ‘helping’ professionals are sometimes
the people gathering information from pregnant women and new
mothers and disclosing it to police, prosecutors and court officials.”172
6. The Disproportionate Impact on Poor Women of Color
At every step along the way, the intersectional and escalating
punitive impact of drug testing of pregnant women falls
disproportionately on poor African American women.173
As detailed above, the process of regulatory intersectionality
begins with the decision to administer a drug test to the mother or
infant. A recent study was designed to test whether race was used as a
factor in deciding whether to test newborns in a context where detailed
protocols were in place to guide the decision to test the newborn.
After examining the records of 2,121 mother infant pairs, the
researchers discovered that, despite the existence of detailed protocols
dictating when testing should occur, 35.1% of infants born to Black
mothers who met the screening criteria were tested. In contrast only
12.9% of children born to White women who met the screening
criteria were tested. The researchers therefore concluded that, “race
was used as a factor for determining whether infants should be
screened for illicit drugs, even at an institution with a standard
protocol that did not include race as a screening factor.”174
Other researchers have focused on rate of referral of children to
child protection agencies. A study conducted in 1990 by Chasnoff et
al. as well as a more recent 2012 study conducted by Sarah Roberts
171

Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
173
Although it would certainly be important to trace these phenomena for other
communities of color, I focus on the African American community for two reasons.
First, the majority of available data has more detailed and reliable information for
African Americans as opposed to other groups. Second, given the targeting of social
welfare, child welfare and criminal justice mechanisms at poor African American
communities in particular, this analysis is an important place to start.
174
Marc A. Ellsworth, Timothy P. Stevens & Carl T. D’Angio, Infant Race
Affects Application of Clinical Guidelines When Screening for Drugs of Abuse in
Newborns, 125 PEDIATRICS 1382 (2010)(the researchers found that, ““criteria
indication screening should be performed seemed to be selectively ignored…for
infants born to white women.”).
172
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and Amani Nuru-Jeter provide compelling data on the extent of
disproportionality in the rate of referrals. Chasnoff et al. sought to
determine the rate of illicit drug use among pregnant women
throughout public and private health care facilities and to explore
whether the rates of drug test results reporting correlated with the rates
of drug use. They conducted the study shortly after Florida adopted a
statewide policy mandating, “the reporting [to the Department of
Health] of births to mother who used drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy.”175 Pursuant to state policy a positive toxicology screen
from either the mother or the child was sufficient evidence to require
such a report.176
During a one-month period the researchers obtained a urine sample
from “every woman who enrolled for prenatal care … at each of the
five Pinellas County Health Unit Clinics and from every woman who
entered prenatal care . . . at the offices of each of 12 private obstetrical
practices in the county.”177 In total they obtained a sample from 715
women. The results across race and class were striking. Of the 715
women, 14.8% tested positive for alcohol, cannabinoids (marijuana),
cocaine or opiates. A slightly higher percentage of white women
(15.4%) than black women (14.1%) tested positive.
As to
socioeconomic status, which the researchers determined from the
economic demographics of the zip code in which women lived, the
researchers concluded that “socioeconomic status . . . did not predict a
positive result on toxicologic testing.”178
Despite essentially
equivalent rates of positive toxicology screens across race and class,
only 1.1% of white women were reported, whereas 10.7% of black
women were reported. “Thus, a black woman was 9.6 times more
likely than a white woman to be reported for substance abuse during
pregnancy.”179
Roberts and Nuru-Jeter’s study suggests similar findings. Relying
on a variety of government data collected for administrative reasons,
Roberts and Nuru-Jeter examined data from a set of providers in
California that had implemented universal testing of pregnant women
175

Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug and Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory
Reporting in Pinellas County Florida, 322 NEW ENGL J. MED 1202 (1990).
176
Id. at 1203.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 1204.
179
Id.
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for drug and alcohol use. They sought to determine whether drug and
alcohol use varied by race and whether there were disparities in
reporting by race. They concluded that, “[d]espite Black women
having alcohol-drug use identified by prenatal providers at similar
rates to White women and entering treatment more than expected,
Black newborns were four times more likely than White newborns to
be reported to CPS at delivery.”180 However, the study authors also
note that, due to some differences among the data sets that they drew
on in order to reach their findings, it is likely that African American
children were reported at even more disproportionate rates than their
data suggests.181
It is also clearly true that the prosecution of pregnant women for
crimes arising from their pregnancies falls disproportionately on poor
African American women. Of the 368 women in the Paltrow and
Flavin study for which the race of the woman was available, 59% were
women of color and 52% were African American.182 African
American women were particularly overrepresented in the South, and
were also more likely to be more harshly prosecuted. Of the 354 cases
involving prosecutions, 295 were felony prosecutions.183 While 71%
of the White women were charged with felonies, 85% of the African
American women were charged with felonies.184 In addition, 71% of
the women in the study qualified for indigent defense, a clear

180

Sarah C.M. Roberts & Amani Nuru-Jeter, Universal Screening for Alcohol
and Drug Use and Racial Disparities in Child Protective Services Reporting, 39 J.
BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 3, 3 (2012).
181
Id. at 14-15 (explaining that, due to some variations in information available
in the multiple data sets they used to reach their conclusions, “comparison of racial
distributions of identification data (including the data from the private provider) and
reporting data would be expected to show an even greater overrepresentation of
Black women among those reported to CPS than among those identified through
screening in prenatal care.”).
182
Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 162, at 311. Due to limitations in the data,
Paltrow and Flavin did not have access to data revealing the race of everyone in their
sample. The entire sample of 413 were comprised of cases in which, “a woman’s
pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual deprivations of the
woman’s physical liberty.” Of those 413, 354 involved, involved “. . . efforts to
deprive pregnant women of their liberty . . . through the use of existing criminal
statutes intended for other purposes.” Id. at 321. The 368 women of color cited
above appear to include both those prosecuted and those subject to other attempted
or actual deprivations of liberty.
183
Id. at 311.
184
Id., at 322.
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indication that these state interventions disproportionately affect poor
women.185
B. Applying for Welfare:
Drug Testing, Child Protection
Interventions and Criminal Prosecutions
In recent years, Congress and legislatures across the country have
considered, and in seven states passed, legislation to condition the
receipt of TANF benefits on consenting to and passing a drug test. In
comparison to the research on pregnant women and drug use discussed
above, we know very little about how these programs actually operate,
whom they affect and how, and the extent and mechanisms of
transmission of information from the welfare system into the child
welfare and criminal systems. Although we do know in general that
punitive policies in the welfare context tend to be targeted
disproportionately at recipients of color,186 we do not have specific
data to indicate that that this is occurring in welfare drug testing
programs or at the intersections of those programs and other systems.
This lack of information comes in part from the relative newness of
these programs and in part from the lack of scholars from other
disciplines that focus on these issues. Nevertheless, this article
highlights this example for a few reasons. First, given the growing
trend within state legislatures to institute drug testing programs within
their welfare programs, the information below highlights how
variations in how statutes are framed can matter a great deal for those
who need welfare. To that extent, it gives some information to
advocates who might be involved in trying to oppose or shape these
programs. In addition, while the majority of scholarship to date on
185

Id. at 311.
See Hearing Series on Welfare Reform, Work Requirements on the TANF
Cash Welfare Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the
H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 60-69 (2001) (statement of Steve
Savner, Senior Staff Att’y, Center for Law and Social Policy). National data
suggests that both outcome and the quality of service provision in welfare programs
vary along race lines. For example, data measuring “leavers,” or households exiting
welfare, in Ilinois from June 1997 to June 1999 revealed racial disparities in the
reasons for case closure: “A total of 340,958 cases closed . . . , of which 102,423
were whites and 238,535 were minorities. Fifty-four percent of minority cases, but
only 39 percent of white cases, closed because the recipient failed to comply with
program rules.” Id. at 65. In addition, various studies indicate better treatment of
white recipients than African American recipients in regard to positive
encouragement and assistance in job search and provision of supportive assistance
such as transportation help. Id.
186
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welfare drug testing has focused on the Fourth Amendment and
unconstitutional conditions issues at play,187 this article highlights
how, in this relatively new area of social welfare policy, all the pieces
are being put in place to use these systems to impose ever escalating
punitive consequences on those who seek aid. In this sense, describing
it in this way again provides fodder for those who seek grounds to
expose the punitive nature of these programs. Finally, noting the way
that regulatory mechanisms are being put in place to facilitate the
imposition of ever escalating consequences in this relatively new
program provides further evidence of its significance as a key feature
of how we govern in social welfare programs.
1. Welfare Drug Testing: Federal Authority and A Trend on the Rise
This legislative trend finds its roots in the devolution of welfare
policy embodied in the 1996 welfare reform law. In 1996, Congress
enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(hereinafter PRA), legislation that fundamentally altered the domestic
social safety net by eliminating the entitlement to cash assistance for
needy families with dependent children, eliminating benefits for a
wide range of lawful immigrants and, among other key elements,
devolving significant authority for designing the newly-termed
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (hereinafter TANF) to the
states. To guide states in exercising their newly devolved authority,
the legislation included a series of provisions permitting the states to
include various features in their TANF program. For example,
although the PRA generally bars receipt of TANF benefits to adults
after five years, states are authorized to, and in fact have, significantly
shortened that period of time.188 Similarly, the PRA included a
provision authorizing states to condition receipt of benefits under the
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program to those who do not
test positive for drugs. As the legislation states, “[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law, States shall not be prohibited by the
Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of
187

See e.g. Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for your Bread: Welfare, Drug
Testing and the Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751
(2011); Walker Newell, Tax Dollars Earmarked for Drugs? The Policy and
Constitutionality of Drug Testing Welfare Recipients, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
215 (2011); Frank G. Barile, Note and Comment, Learning from Lebron: The
Suspicionless Drug Testing of TANF Applicants, 26 J. OF CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV.
789 (2012); Ilan Wurman, Note, Drug Testing Welfare Recipients As An
Unconstitutional Condition, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1153 (2013).
188
42 U.S.C. §608(a)(7) (2012).
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controlled substances nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test
positive for use of controlled substances . . .”189 Although in the
several years directly following welfare reform, the focus of state
activity around drug abuse was on screening and referral to treatment
and drug felony bans,190 in the last several years, there has been an
increasing focus on drug testing in both TANF and other public benefit
programs.
The trend toward conditioning receipt of public benefits on passing
drug tests began in earnest late in 2009 when over twenty states
proposed legislation. Over the course of the next several years, despite
an unfavorable court ruling holding that suspicionless drug testing
programs cannot survive scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment,191
states continued to try to enact this legislation.192 In 2010, at least
twelve states proposed legislation mandating drug testing of welfare
recipients. In 2011, bills were introduced in 36 states.193 In addition,
twelve legislatures proposed drug testing for unemployment and two
189

21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (1996).
See Office of the Assistant Sec’y for Planning and Evaluation, ASPE Issue
Brief: Drug Testing Welfare Recipients: Recent Proposals and Continuing
Controversies, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, (2011),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/11/DrugTesting/ib.pdf.
191
Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309
F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g granted en banc, vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir.
2003), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003). The state
of Michigan was the first state to enact a suspicionless drug testing provision that led
to denial of benefits. This program, which was enacted in 1999, was immediately
challenged and enjoined by the District Court. The District Court held that
Michigan’s suspicionless drug testing program violated the Fourth Amendment. On
appeal the Sixth Circuit initially reversed that opinion only to have the case accepted
for hearing en banc. The en banc court split down the middle, with half of the
justices voting for affirmance and half voting for reversal. The result in the case was
therefore affirmative of the District Court’s opinion. Despite the fact that, for the
purposes of the Michigan program the provisions are unconstitutional, the split
between the judges and between the District and the original appellate bench that
heard the case clearly indicate that the law in this area remains profoundly unsettled.
More recently the District Court in the Middle District of Florida recently
preliminarily enjoined Florida’s suspicionless drug testing program. See Lebron v.
Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011). The case is currently being
appealed.
192
See Drug Testing and Public Assistance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/drug-testingand-public-assistance.aspx (last updated Apr. 17, 2013) (“In 2009, over 20 states
proposed legislation that would require drug testing as a condition of eligibility for
public assistance programs. In 2010 at least 12 states had similar proposals.”).
193
Id.
190
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cities, Chicago, Illinois and Flint, Michigan proposed a program to ban
those who fail a drug test from public housing.194 In 2012, at least 28
states proposed such legislation.195 In addition, in 2012, Congress
enacted a provision authorizing states to condition receipt of
unemployment benefits, in some circumstances, on passing a drug
test.196 Since the 2012 presidential election, legislators in at least four
states have said they will introduce or have introduced bills.197 Today,
seven states – Arizona, Florida, Missouri, Tennessee, Georgia, Ohio
and Utah – have enacted welfare drug testing programs that allow for
partial or complete denial of benefits for refusing to take or failure to
pass a drug test.198
Both the enacted and the vast swath of proposed legislation vary
significantly on several key issues: the severity of the penalty
imposed;199 the emphasis on sanction versus treatment;200 and crucially
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, whether or not the state
must have some reasonable suspicion before testing.201 States law and
194

A.G. Sulzberger, States Adding Drug Test as Hurdle for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/states-adding-drug-test-ashurdle-for-welfare.html?_r=0.
195
Drug Testing and Public Assistance, supra note 189 (“At least 28 states put
forth proposals requiring drug testing for public assistance applicants or recipients in
2012.”).
196
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96,
sec. 2105, § 303, 126 Stat 156, 162-63 (2012) (allowing states to condition receipt
of unemployment benefits on passing a drug test for any applicant who, “(i) was
terminated from employment with the applicant's most recent employer (as defined
under the State law) because of the unlawful use of controlled substances; or (ii) is
an individual for whom suitable work (as defined under the State law) is only
available in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing (as determined under
regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor)”).
197
Morgan Whitaker, More States Consider Welfare Drug-Testing Bills,
MSNBC (Dec. 7, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/politicsnation/morestates-consider-welfare-drug-testing-bil ("Ohio, Virginia, and Kansas are not the first
states to take up the measure since Election Day. Lone Star State Gov. Rick Perry
himself filed a bill in the Texas state legislature in mid-November…").
198
Drug Testing and Public Assistance, supra note 189.
199
Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(d) (West 2012) (imposing progressive
sanctions based on the number of positive tests beginning with a one month sanction)
with 2013 Ariz, Legis. Serv. Ch. 2, §14) (imposing one year sanction for testing
positive).
200
Compare 2013 Ariz, Legis. Serv. Ch. 2, §14 (imposing one year sanction for
testing positive) with TN CODE ANN. § 71-3-1202(h)(1) (West 2012) (allowing
individuals who test positive to receive benefits for six months while in treatment).
201
Compare MO. ANN. STAT § 208.027(1) (West 2012) (requiring that the
Department of Social Services, “screen each applicant or recipient who is otherwise
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legislative proposals also vary as to what public benefits are included,
ranging from proposals that limit testing to TANF to proposals that
include TANF, Supplemental Assistance to Needy Families (formerly
termed Food Stamps), unemployment and Medicaid.
2. The Penalty for Failing a Drug Test Within the TANF Program
Although each statute imposes a penalty on the applicant and/or
the applicant’s dependent children for failing or refusing the drug test,
the penalties do vary substantially. For example, in Arizona applicants
who fail or refuse a drug screen are ineligible for benefits for one
calendar year.202 In other states the penalties are progressive, based on
the number of times one fails a drug screen. For example, in Georgia
the first time one fails the applicant loses one month of benefits, but
subsequent failed tests lead to progressively longer sanctions. In
addition, some states will allow applicants to receive benefits if they
enroll in or once they have completed drug treatment. For example, in
Tennessee if one enrolls in drug treatment one can receive benefits for
six months while in treatment. If the applicant refuses treatment or is
positive at the end of treatment, benefits are denied for at least six
months. Similarly, in Oklahoma, if one enters treatment, the penalty,
which is otherwise twelve months without benefits, can be reduced to
six. However, it is important to note that no state legislation creating
drug testing mandates include provisions giving priority for drug
treatment to welfare applicants nor are there any provisions within
those statutes granting additional funding for drug treatment. Given
the overall dearth of drug treatment programs for the poor, 203 the
inclusion of provisions allowing individuals to receive benefits as long
as they are in treatment is somewhat disingenuous.
eligible for temporary assistance for needy families benefits under this chapter, and
then test, using a urine dipstick five panel test, each one who the department has
reasonable cause to believe, based on the screening, engages in illegal use of
controlled substances . . .”) with GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193(c) (West 2012)
(requiring a drug test for “each individual who applies for assistance”). For an
extensive summary of proposed and enacted legislation as of 2011, see Drug Testing
Welfare Recipients: Recent Proposals and Continuing Controversies, supra note
186, Appendix A.
202
2013 Ariz, Legis. Serv. Ch. 2, §14 (denying benefits for one year as a result
of a positive drug test).
203
Victor Capoccia, Dennis McCarty, & Laura Schmidt, Closing the Addiction
Treatment Gap: A Priority for Health Care Reform, SPOTLIGHT ON POVERTY AND
OPPORTUNITY,
(May
3,
2010)
http://www.spotlightonpoverty.org/ExclusiveCommentary.aspx?id=049a9de2-a1fc447e-b36d-3ac90e0bca10.
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In looking at this program through the lens of regulatory
intersectionality, it is important to understand the financial
consequence to the family for what the program defines as
sanctionable or deviant conduct, in this case, the failure or refusal of a
drug screen. In evaluating the nature and severity of this consequence,
it is helpful to keep a few facts in mind. First, in order to qualify for
TANF benefits, you must, among other criteria, be extremely poor.
Take as an example a three-person household with one adult, one preschool age child and one school age child living in Phoenix, Arizona.
That family would not qualify for benefits if they have countable
income in excess of Arizona’s defined standard of need for their
family size. For this family of three, they could only qualify for
TANF benefits if they have less than $964 in monthly income.204
That same family, however, would not receive $964 in TANF benefits
were they accepted into the program. Instead, if all three household
members received benefits, they would receive a maximum of $278
per month or $3,336 per year.205 If the adult in that family fails or
refuses the drug screen, the family would receive, for an entire
calendar year, benefits only for the two children. 206 Their TANF grant
would then be reduced by 21% from $278 per month to a mere $220
per month or $2,640 per year.207
To understand just how low this cash grant is, it is helpful to
compare it to two different measures. A first point of comparison is
the federal poverty threshold, a measure that is nearly universally
acknowledged as outdated and is regarded in many quarters as far too
low.208 The Arizona family of three would fall below the federal
poverty line if they earned less than $19,090 in income per year.209
So the reduced cash grant that results from the drug test sanction
lowers the families cash assistance from 18% of the federal poverty
level for full benefits to 14% of the poverty level once the sanction is
imposed.
204

Cash Assistance A1 Needs Standards, ARIZ. DEP’T OF ECON. SECURITY,
https://www.azdes.gov/popup.aspx?id=5422 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
205
Id.
206
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-201(29).
207
Cash Assistance A1 Needs Standards, supra note 201.
208
For an in-depth discussion of the insufficiency of the current federal poverty
measure, see Bach, supra note 79, at 278-81.
209
2012 Poverty Guidelines, 77 Fed. Reg. 4034, 4035 (January 26, 2012),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/12poverty.shtml.
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Another useful way to look at these numbers is to compare the
family’s income under the sanction to what they actually need to meet
basic needs. The Center for Women’s Welfare at the University of
Washington School of Social Work and its director Diana Pierce
developed the Self Sufficiency Standard to assist in such analysis.210
The standard provides a rigorous methodology for calculating how
much income particular families, in particular geographic locations,
need to meet their basic needs211 without public or private assistance.
According to the 2012 Arizona Self Sufficiency Standard, for the same
family, were they to receive no private or public assistance
whatsoever, the adult would need to work full time and earn $24.20
per hour for a total of $51,115 in income per year to meet all the
families’ basic needs.212 Even if one makes the optimistic assumption
that this family is receiving other benefits, such as Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance, Medicaid and, perhaps if they are very lucky,
subsidized housing, losing $696 in annual income is a devastating
blow.
3. Welfare Drug Testing At The Intersections: Intervention by Child
Protective and Criminal Justice Systems.
The penalty to the family for the failed or refused drug screen does
not stop at the drastic reduction in their already tremendously low
level of assistance. The second aspect of regulatory intersectionality
describes what else might happen to this family as a result of the
stigmatized conduct. As noted above, one variable along which
various welfare drug testing statutes differ is the extent of privacy
protections built into the legislation. Of particular interest, for the
purposes of discussing regulatory intersectionality, are provisions
concerning the sharing of this information among government
agencies and in particular provisions that allow or mandate the sharing
of results with child protective agencies, that require some level of
210

For additional information on the standard, see generally The Self-Sufficiency
Standard,
THE
CTR.
FOR
WOMEN’S
WELFARE,
http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org (last visited Sept. 26, 2013).
211
Under the standards methodology, basic needs include geographically
specific calculations of expenses in six categories: housing, childcare, food,
transportation, healthcare and an addition 10% in miscellaneous expenses. The
Center on Women’s Welfare, How is the Self Sufficiency Standard Calculated
(January 9, 2013), http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/standard.html#howis.
212
Diana M. Pearce, How Much Is Enough In Your County? The SelfSufficiency Standard for Arizona 2012, CENTER FOR WOMEN’S WELFARE 59 (May
2012), http://www.selfsufficiencystandard.org/docs/Arizona_2012.pdf.
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child protective investigation and that raise the specter of data sharing
with criminal justice agencies.
When looking at these intersecting system phenomena, it is crucial
to keep in mind some basic background rules in the area. First,
although the extent of privacy protections for drug tests has been
eroding in a variety of contexts,213 its remains true that requiring
individuals to consent to a drug test which requires that person to
urinate, likely in the presence of a government employee and then give
that urine sample to the agency, invades a long protected and long
recognized zone of bodily integrity and privacy. As the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has stated, “[t]here are few activities in
our society more personal or private than the passing of urine. Most
people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all.”214 For
this reason, the Supreme Court in Skinner v Oklahoma made clear that
a mandatory urinalysis constitutes a search for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.215
Moreover, as was the case in the health care setting described
above, even before the advent of this spate of welfare drug-testing
legislation, welfare officials across the nation216 and in six of the seven
states that have enacted welfare drug testing programs were already
required to report suspected abuse to child protective agencies.217
213

See supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.Error! Bookmark not
defined..
214
Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union v. Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987).
215
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989).
216
See, e.g., Child Welfare Information Gateway, supra note 107, at 2
(“Approximately 48 States, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands designate professions
whose members are mandated by law to report child maltreatment. Individuals
designated as mandatory reporters typically have frequent contact with children.
Such individuals may include . . . Social workers; Teachers, principals, and other
school personnel; Physicians, nurses, and other health-care workers; Counselors,
therapists, and other mental health professionals; Child care providers; Medical
examiners or coroners, Law enforcement officers.”). See also Kathryn Krase,

Making the Tough Call: Social Workers as Mandated Reporters, THE NEW
SOCIAL WORKER: THE SOCIAL WORK CAREER MAGAZINE, April 6, 2013
(available
at
http://www.socialworker.com/featurearticles/practice/Making_the_Tough_Call%3A_Social_Workers_as_Mandate
d_Reporters,_Part_I/)(last visited December 5, 2013).
217

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.201 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115 (West
2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1403 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. §62A-4a-403 (West 2013).
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Thus, the mechanisms described below, to facilitate and in some cases
mandate reporting and investigation in light of a positive drug test,
seem at best superfluous and at worst, yet another hyperregulatory
mechanism to target, punish and criminalize poor, African American
mothers.
Jurisdictions vary significantly in the use and strength of privacy
protections. One jurisdiction appears to bar the use of test results in
collateral investigations and proceedings; many are silent, and a few
permit disclosure. In two jurisdictions, however, the programs go
beyond permissive disclosure to mandate disclosure to and in some
cases intervention by child protection agencies. In addition, in many
jurisdictions results of welfare drug tests are available to police and
prosecutors. In these cases, the programs seem to be designed to
snowball the possible detrimental effect of the positive test far beyond
the sanction included in the statute and described above.
Of the seven states that have enacted welfare drug testing programs
to date, the statute enacted in Georgia is the only one that appears to
provide a comprehensive ban on the use of test results in other
investigations and proceedings. The statute provides that,
[t]he results of any drug test done according to this Code
section . . . shall not be used as a part of a criminal
investigation or criminal prosecution. Such results shall not be
used in a civil action or otherwise disclosed to any person or
entity without the express written consent of the person tested
or his or her heirs or legal representative.218
In contrast to the Georgia provision, most of statutes enacted in the
past several years allow disclosure of the drug test results to some or
all government agencies. For example, while the Oklahoma and
Arizona statutes are silent on the issue of privacy protection,219 each
state's general records access provision allow the sharing of data

218

GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-193 (2012).
The silence of the particular welfare drug testing statutes in these states could
very well mean, as was the case in Florida, that in implementing the statute, the
agencies will enact policies that mandate reporting and action by other parts of the
state administrative structure. For a discussion of how this occurred in Florida, see
infra notes 224-226 and accompanying text.
219
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between government agencies.220 Similarly, although the Utah statute
bars public disclosure of the test results,221 underlying records access
provisions allow government agencies to provide data to any entity
that, "enforces, litigates, or investigates civil, criminal, or
administrative law, and the record is necessary to a proceeding or
investigation.”222 Tennessee's statute is more restrictive, barring the
use of all information received by the department in connection with
the drug testing program, "in any public or private proceeding. . . ."223
However an exception is carved out for any proceeding, "concerning
the protection or permanency of children." In addition, although the
ban clearly forbids the use of the drug test results in formal
proceedings, there appears to be no ban on using them in
investigations of any criminal or civil nature, thus leaving open the
possibility that the results could be shared with child protection
agencies and police.
Two states, Florida and Missouri, go beyond permissive sharing of
data to mandate data transmission and investigation by the child
protective agencies. The underlying statutes also clearly allow the use
of positive drug tests in criminal prosecutions. Like some of the
statutes discussed above, the Florida statute that implemented the drug
testing program was silent as to the issue of privacy and data
sharing.224 Nevertheless when designing the procedures to be used in
implementing the program, the Florida Department of Children and
Families instituted procedures which included the sharing of positive
drug tests with the Florida Abuse Hotline.225 As described by the
220

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-807 (2013) (requiring disclosure of child
protection records to various government entities to enable such entities, “to meet
their duties to provide for the safety, permanency and well-being of a child, provide
services to a parent, guardian or custodian or provide services to family members to
strengthen the family pursuant to this chapter; . . . [t]o enforce or prosecute any
violation involving child abuse or neglect. . . . [and t]o provide information to a
defendant after a criminal charge has been filed as required by an order of the
criminal court.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 1-6-103 (1993) (allowing inspections
without a court order of Juvenile and Department of Human Services records by
offices of the Attorney General, and law enforcement personnel).
221
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-3-304.5(5) (West 2012) ("The result of a drug test
given under this section is a private record in accordance with Section 63G-2-302
and disclosure to a third party is prohibited except as provided under Title 63G,
Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act.").
222
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-2-206(1)(b) (West 2013).
223
S.B. 2580, 107 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2013).
224
FLA. STAT. ANN. §414.0652 (West 2011).
225
Complaint at 10, Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011)
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District Court in its decision enjoining the Florida program,
DCF shares all positive drug tests for controlled substances
with the Florida Abuse Hotline. . . . After receiving a positive
drug test, a hotline counselor enters a Parent Needs Assistance
referral into a child welfare database known as the Florida Safe
Families Network. . . A referral is then prepared . . . so that
'other appropriate response to the referral in the particular
county of residence of the applicant' may be taken. . . . The
statute governing the Florida Abuse Hotline authorizes the
disclosure of records from the abuse hotline to '[c]riminal
justice agencies of appropriate jurisdiction,' as well as '[t]he
state attorney of the judicial circuit in which the child resides
or in which the alleged abuse or neglect occurred.' Law
enforcement officials may access the Florida Safe Families
Network and make such use of the data as they see fit.226
The Missouri statute is explicit and, unlike any of the other
statutes, mandates reporting not only for those who test positive for
drugs but for all those who refuse to take a drug test. The statute
provides that "[c]ase workers [who have knowledge that an applicant
has either failed or refused a drug test] … shall be required to report or
cause a report to be made to the children's division . . . for suspected
child abuse as a result of drug abuse."227
4. Disproportionality
As noted above, in contrast to the health settings, there are no
studies looking specifically at the question of whether welfare drug
testing policies are administered in ways that vary by the race of the
welfare recipient or that negatively and disproportionately impact
African American clients of the system. There is, however, a good
deal of information to merit worry that these policies will, like the
drug testing policies in the healthcare setting, have these impacts. A
few bodies of research justify this concern.
(No. 6:11 Civ. 01473) (stating that applicants are required to sign a "Drug Testing
Information Acknowledgement and Consent Release" which includes, among other
provisions, that applicants consent that "[i]nformation on a failed test will be shared
with the Florida Abuse Hotline for review to initiate an assessment or an offer of
services.").
226
LeBron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (citations
omitted).
227
MO. ANN. STATE §208.027(2) (West 2011).
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First, as to the question of disproportionate impact in the initial
welfare system, while this particular policy has not been studied,
researchers have looked at the impact of punitive welfare policies by
race and have concluded that punitive policies are targeted
disproportionately at clients of color.228 In addition, for those
programs that involve the use of discretion, it is quite clear, as it was in
the healthcare setting, that the existence of discretion correlates with
disproportionate targeting of poor African American women. Moving
beyond the initial welfare setting and to the intersections that arise
from reporting out, we do know as a general matter that African
American children are referred to child welfare agencies in numbers
far outweighing their percentage of the population. Once there, as
Dorothy Roberts and others have compellingly described, African
American families suffer outcomes far worse than their white
counterparts. Similarly, many scholars, including Wacquant and
Alexander, have demonstrated that the criminal justice system impacts
and is in fact targeted at communities of color in general and at the
African American community in particular. Given all this data and
that fact that that the statutory and regulatory framework of welfare
drug testing is structurally very similar to the structure in the health
care setting, there is in fact very good reason to assume that this too
will result in disproportionate punishment of African American
families.
IV. Regulatory Intersectionality, Hyperregulation and the Supportive
State: Implications and Theorizing a Path
At this point, several arguments should be clear. First, as
described in Section III, the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality
are strongly present in the social support programs available to poor
communities in the United States. The result of this is a state that
exacts an enormous punitive toll for seeking support. Second, as
suggested in Section II, the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality
contribute to what is here described as the hyperregulatory state. This
means that programs of the social safety net are targeted, by race,
class, place and gender, to control and subordinate low income
communities in general and low income communities of color in
particular.
In both examples laid out in Section II, punitive
228

See Sanford F. Schram, Contextualizing Racial Disparities in American
Welfare Reform: Toward a New Poverty Research, 3 PERSP. ON POL., 253 (June
2005).
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consequences were clearly meted out disproportionately to poor
African American women.229
If these arguments are true, if the state is not merely nonresponsive but is instead characterized by the specific phenomena of
regulatory intersectionality and the broader mechanisms of
hyperregulation, this analysis has significant implications for
theorizing a road to a supportive state. Returning to the crucial task of
theorizing and building an autonomy enhancing supportive state, what
should be clear initially is that we have a very long and complicated
road ahead. We have, in short, many assumptions to challenge and
much to dismantle before we can begin to build. While the primary
purpose of this article was to describe the functioning of regulatory
intersectionality in detail and frame that specific phenomena in the
broader frame of hyperregulation, what follows below is a brief
discussion of some of the lived and theoretical implications, a more
detailed analysis of the relationship between vulnerability, regulatory
intersectionality, and hyperregulation, some more practical strategies
that might hold promise and a cautionary note about the current
emphasis, within social welfare policy, on collaboration. Necessarily
at this point, what follows raises more questions than it answers.
A. Hyperregulation, Vulnerability, Need and Trust
	
  
Perhaps the most important way to start is by drawing out the lived
implications of the phenomena described above.
Given the
pervasiveness of hyperregulatory structures in poor communities, one
needn’t speculate much in order to understand why many poor women
view America’s safety net with enormous distrust. It is no secret, in
poor communities in the United States, that seeking support involves
extraordinary risk. Listening to the voices of women interviewed by
Dorothy Roberts in her study of the child welfare system is a strong
reminder of this very basic reality. As part of her study, Roberts
interviewed an African American woman from Chicago who described
her own needs and the punitive role of child welfare agencies in her
community. In the woman’s words, one can recognize both a
profound need and well-founded distrust of those who would offer
229

It is important to note that the question of whether the targeting of these
mechanisms is intentional or not is largely irrelevant too. The argument here is that
these many hyperregulatory mechanisms (criminalization, deprivations of basic
privacy, regulatory intersectionality and many more) operate, by race, gender, class
and place, to exert social control and to subordinate particular poor communities.
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“welfare” to her children:
‘[T]he advertisement [for the child abuse hotline], it just says
abuse. If you being abused, this is the number you call, this is
the only way you gonna get help. It doesn't say if I'm in need of
counseling, or if . . . my children don't have shoes, if I just can't
provide groceries even though I may have seven kids, but I
only get a hundred something dollars food stamps. And my
work check only goes to bills. I can't feed eight of us all off a
hundred something dollar food stamps. . . . I don't want to lose
my children, so I'm not going to call [Department of Children
and Family Services] for help because I only see them take
away children.230
Given how the mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality function to
exact ever-escalating punishments on women who seek support, this
woman’s words are unsurprising.
As to the implications for theory, it is helpful to return to
Fineman’s concept of vulnerability (or Eichner’s concept of
dependency), which maintains, at its heart, that we are all vulnerable
(or dependent) and that any theory of the state needs to proceed from
this assumption.231 In light of what is described above, though, it is
both profoundly true and yet insufficient to describe women faced with
these circumstances as vulnerable. These particular women certainly
enter the social welfare state in a state of vulnerability, but once they
enter, the mechanisms of the state are structured to render them more
and more vulnerable, more and more exposed to punishment and
social control. In the examples described above, women who enter
those systems and reveal evidence of behavior that the system deems
deviant or noncompliant (drug use in both of these examples), are in
fact punished within the social welfare program. The women seeking
prenatal care are stripped of their rights to privacy and confidentiality
and deterred from accessing essential health care.232 Women seeking
welfare face not only the clear violation of privacy involved in
submitting to a urine-based drug test, but they face denial, reduction,

230

Dorothy E. Roberts, The Racial Geography of Child Welfare: Toward a New
Research Paradigm, 87 CHILD WELFARE 125, 145-46 (2008) (quoting a woman
named Michelle).
231
See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
232
See infra notes 110-123 and accompanying text.
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or termination of the already meager aid offered by the program.233
But the system is not punitive just in the sense of imposing punishment
as a price of support. Instead, the above analysis reveals these systems
as hyperregulatory in the sense that Wacquant describes. These social
support structures, characterized by regulatory intersectionality,
intersect with other regulatory systems and are structured to exact
ever-escalating consequences for the woman’s deviant conduct. They
are also hyperregulatory in the sense that they are targeted. They exact
these ever-escalating punitive consequences disproportionately on
poor African-American women and poor African-American
communities. Being emeshed in these intersecting systems is thus the
price of seeking support. A woman or family entering these systems is
certainly vulnerable and in need before seeking assistance from the
state. But the analysis above reveals that while seeking support may
meet some very important need in the short term (one for which
women are clearly willing to pay an extraordinary potential cost), it
runs the substantial risk of rendering her more rather than less
vulnerable. She is, once she seeks support, vulnerable not only
because we all are and because meeting one’s needs while living in
poverty is extraordinarily difficult, but she is vulnerable to escalating
punishment by the state.
Moreover, as is the case for many of the hyperregulatory
mechanisms described by scholars such as Wacquant, Roberts,
Bridges, and Alexander, these mechanisms are part and parcel of
larger mechanisms of social control that operate in poor communities.
This ultimately results in distinctions by economic status, by race, by
gender, and often by place, in how the state operates. Centering the
experiences of those subject to these hyperregulatory institutions
creates a set of challenges for building a road toward the supportive
state.
B. (Re)envisioning an Autonomy Enhancing Supportive State
There is no question that we need a more responsive and
supportive state. As Peter Edelman’s work continually reminds us, in
our haste to condemn the nature of the current support programs, we
need to exercise care.234 We need to preserve what we have,
233

See supra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., PETER EDELMAN, SO RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT’S SO HARD TO END
POVERTY IN AMERICA, 7-23 (2012) (briefly retelling the history of social support
since the Great Depression and arguing that in historical perspective, the current
234
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restructure it to be better, and build upon it. Welfare, food stamps,
Medicaid, public housing and other vital programs provide much less
than we need, and, as has been argued here, are in many cases part and
parcel of the creation of a hyperregulatory state. But at the same time
they are tremendously important. We certainly need those programs to
be restructured, but it would be beyond foolish to suggest that the
appropriate response to the problems described in this article is to
dismantle those programs. We need instead to look critically at the
structures and administration of these programs. And beyond that we
need a state that offers significantly more support to families across
the economic spectrum and that does so in ways that support rather
than undermine the ability of families and communities to meet their
needs and their goals. When Eichner and Roberts call for a set of
supportive programs in a newly envisioned child welfare system that
offer significant assistance to families all along the way rather than
intervening only when there is a crisis and then only to punish, they
are calling for more and better support.235 The question posed by this
article is not whether we need such a supportive or responsive state.
We clearly do. Instead it asks how we might re-envision both the
support programs we already have and the ones we need in order to
enhance the autonomy of families in poverty.
1. An Autonomy-Supporting State: Abandoning Both Violations of
Privacy and Structures of Punishment
On a theoretical level, in order to build a responsive state, we must
significantly expand our collective notion of what constitutes and
enables the exercise of autonomy. As explained in Section I, this
involves abandoning the flawed notion of an autonomous subject and
replacing it with a conception of the vulnerable or dependent subject.
safety net, although profoundly inadequate, has strong elements and provides
significant support).
235
In the conclusion of SHATTERED BONDS, Roberts provides a compelling
vision of a newly structured child welfare system. Although she calls for changes
well beyond this, an essential piece involves shifting the emphasis to family support
and preservation. As she describes it, “Federal and state governments already spend
more than $10 billion annually on the child welfare system. But most of the money
goes to maintaining children in out-of-home care. Centering the system’s services
on family support and preservation would be a matter of shifting these funds from
their current destructive purpose.” ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS, supra note 76, at
269. Eichner provides similar vision of how we might restructure that system: “In
contrast to the existing system . . . the government would funnel its resources first
and foremost into ensuring that existing families have the social support to provide
for children’s well being.” EICHNER, supra note 2, at 119.
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This would give rise to a state that would be compelled to provide the
material conditions necessary for people to exercise a much more
robust version of autonomy. It also holds promise in that it could also
lead, in Fineman’s vision, to far more substantive equality.236 One
mechanism to ensure this level of autonomy enhancing support lies, as
Roberts argues, in a much more robust conception of privacy. As
Roberts frames it, “merely ensuring the individual’s ‘right to be let
alone’ – may be inadequate to protect the dignity and autonomy of the
poor and oppressed.”237 Indeed a better notion of privacy “includes
not only the negative proscription against government coercion, but
236

See infra note 31 and accompanying text. For a strong endorsement of the
strength of these claims to counter the subordination within the legal structures that
target poor African American communities see Kaaryn Gustafson, Degradation
Ceremonies and the Criminalization of Low Income Women, ___ U.C. IRVINE L. REV
101, 152 (2013) (arguing that “[t]he simple rhetorical transition from using the terms
“the poor” to “the vulnerable” may help shift and soften some of the disgust now
aimed at the poor. . . [A]ddressing economic vulnerability requires a material
commitment to making sure that grim failures of structural economic risk are not
borne disproportionately by the most vulnerable members of society, namely lowincome women of color and their children. The existence of deep poverty in the
United States is not a sign of widespread behavioral failures by individuals; it is an
expression of political will. Deep poverty can be willed away by divesting
government monies from policies that criminalize the poor and investing monies in
basic subsistence.”)(NOTE TO LR EDITOR – I PULLED THIS QUOTE AND THE
PAGE NUMBER FROM A PAGE PROOF COPY I RECEIVED FROM KAARYN.
WE WILL NEED TO PULL THE FINAL VERSION ONCE IT’S OUT). If in fact,
the state is compelled, through this restructured notion of autonomy, to provide the
support we collectively need to realize a more robust vision of self-determination,
this could give rise to a quite radical restructuring of social and economic
institutions. One need only recall the discussion above of today’s vast income
disparities and the atrociously inadequate material failure of the current safety net to
meet the needs of those in poverty to see that a supportive state on these terms,
would require significant economic and political change. June Carbone has recently
suggested that Eichner’s work leads almost inevitably to these consequences. In a
recent review of Eichner’s book, Carbone suggested that, while Eichner herself does
not conclude that her vision would require a significant restructuring of structural
economic inequality, fully realizing the theory would require such a restructuring.
June Carbone, Book Review, The Supportive State: Families, Government, and
America’s Political Ideals, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 241, 242 (2013) (“If we assume, for
example, as a growing body of evidence indicates, that greater inequality itself harms
family stability, would liberal theory compel adoption of more egalitarian policies
even at the expense of greater economic ‘inefficiency’? Does the state have an
obligation to address class-based differences in fertility in order to compel greater
equality? Must it champion stronger families even if higher taxes or greater
regulation limit the autonomy of the wealthy? If greater inequality is inevitably a
threat to the family, does that make it intrinsically incompatible with justice for that
reason alone?”).
237
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 76, at 1478.
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also the affirmative duty of government to protection the individual’s
personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice
and self-determination.”238
But the import of the existence of regulatory intersectionality suggests
that in addition to privacy from intrusion and an affirmative duty of
support one needs safety from punishment. To understand how this
might function it is helpful to briefly examine the phenomena of
privacy intrusions and escalating punishment in turn.
As to privacy, Khiara Bridges argues that social support programs
like PCAP are so fundamentally imbued with structures that assume no
privacy that, in our current socio-political and legal environment, it is
more accurate to say that the poor families have no privacy rights to
begin within.239 This is certainly born out in her careful analysis as
well as in the examples above. Although the focus of this article has
been on the mechanisms of escalating punishment rather than on the
privacy deprivations inherent in these programs, there is no question
that these examples also confirm Bridges’ characterization of social
support.
The focus on the regulatory mechanisms that lead to ever escalating
punishment suggests a separate and additional price. Poor women
seeking support not only suffer extraordinary deprivations of privacy,
but those deprivations of privacy lead to the gathering (and negative
characterization) of information, which then in turn leads to additional
punishment.
Kaaryn Gustafson’s extensive work on the
criminalization of welfare240 lays bare many of the mechanisms that
are in place to exact this punitive toll. The mechanisms of enhanced
punishment and disproportionate impact of regulatory intersectionality
238

Id. at 1479.
Bridges, supra note 55, at 173. Bridges argues from her example that class
controls who has rights and that the poor simply fall on the wrong side of the
dividing line. Id. One could easily point to the mechanisms and outcomes in this
article and come to the same conclusion. In her discussion, Bridges turns to the
viability of the rights frameworks suggested by Roberts, Eichman and Fineman,
among others, which Bridges characterizes as “rights to” as opposed to “rights
against.” Id. at 174. In discussing the viability of these rights, she raises the
disturbing possibility that “[t]here is a danger that the poor would, in spite of a
revolutionary reformulation of rights, find themselves in the same predicament in
which they now find themselves: possessing ‘rights’ without substance, meaning or
effect.” Bridges, supra note 55, at 174. This prospect is similarly raised by the
mechanisms described in this article.
240
See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
239
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described above provide further information about precisely how the
state administers itself to facilitate enhanced punishment.
To return to the examples in Section III, the cost a poor woman
pays for support is not only the devastating cost of losing control of
her home, her body, and her personal information. She also submits,
as a price of support, to serious risk of punishment. To put it
differently, while it should be true, as the Supreme Court noted in
Ferguson, that “[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the
typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the
results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel
without her consent,”241 for poor, disproportionately African American
women, this is an assumption that does not comport with reality.
Given how mechanisms of regulatory intersectionality actually
function, it is far more reasonable for a poor, African-American
woman to assume both that she has no privacy and that the cost of
seeking prenatal or childbirth care may well be the investigation of her
family, the loss of her children, and her possible prosecution and
incarceration. And this is true for her even though her higher income
white counterpart, who is just as likely to have used drugs during her
pregnancy, is far less likely to face these escalating penalties. An
applicant for welfare faces similar risks and may pay a similar price.
To rewrite this formula, then, is to abandon the structural
mechanisms not only of deprivations of privacy, but those mechanisms
that facilitate escalating punishment. To the extent that the phenomena
of regulatory intersectionality facilitates hyperregulation – the
targeting by race, class, gender and place of particular people so as to
exert social control on those people – we must dismantle it and build
something better in its place. Below are some far more practically
focused suggestions about how we might think about getting there.
C. Some Steps on the Path Forward
As briefly detailed in Section II, in the 1930s the United States
made a fundamental decision to bifurcate its programs of social
support. One system was put in place for those who are not poor and
another was put in place for those who are poor and “deserving.”242
As a matter of law and systems, this allows us to administer these two
categories of assistance in profoundly different ways. So even though
241
242

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001).
See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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it seems evident that a middle class family receiving social security
retirement benefits or Medicare would never tolerate the price of
support imposed for poor families, this poses no administrative
problem. The two systems can be and in fact are simply run
tremendously differently.
To the extent that this is true, one answer to the question of how to
move forward lies both in moving when possible to benefits that are
more universal, or short of that benefits that are quasi-universal as
described below. To the extent that moving towards universal (or
quasi-universal) benefits is not politically feasible, moving forward
involves restructuring poverty targeted programs in four ways:
erecting more privacy protections and higher bars on surveillance and
monitoring in the first place, enforcing and creating new privacy
protections within systems once information is collected, building
higher walls between support systems and punishment systems and
finally exercising significant caution in the face of calls for
coordination and collaboration.
1.

Towards Universal Benefits and Universally Employed Structures
(But Carefully)243

As noted in Section II of this article,244 the institutions of the social
welfare state in the United States have, since at least the New Deal,
been bifurcated, with one set of programs - social security, Medicare
and the like - going to one group of people and another set - Welfare,
Medicaid, Food Stamps (now the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program or SNAP) and the like - going to the poor. Although it has
not been a focus of this article, other scholars have documented the
ways in which these poverty-focused programs have been
characterized by behavioral controls and racialized tropes. They have
243

Eichner’s vision of the Supportive State impacts a wide range of policy areas.
Very roughly speaking realizing a supportive state would entail revisions of both
how the market operates and the creation of programs and institutions to address
vulnerability and dependency needs. In the first category, the supportive state would
include policies regulating the market: “upper limit[s] on mandatory working hours,
… paid time off for caretaking, [prohibitions on the firing of] parents of young
children … for refusing to work overtime, and … flexible hours [requirements].”
EICHNER, supra note 2, at 65. On the programmatic and institutional side the
supportive state would include the provision of, for example, universal health care,
subsidized high quality childcare and pre school education and high quality public
schools. The analysis in this paper focuses exclusively on the programmatic and
institutional support mechanisms of the supportive state.
244
See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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also extensively documented the ways in which, as legal barriers to
receipt fell in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the rolls grew to
include significant numbers of African American families, an
extraordinary backlash took place. This backlash wielded racial tropes
(the most powerful among them was the welfare queen) to radically
restructure and gut virtually all of what remained of what was Aid to
Families With Dependent Children. Even today, as the “new” welfare
program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, is almost entirely
in shambles, provides less and less, and serves fewer and fewer of
those in need,245 it remains the continued target of significant punitive
legislative and popular attack. One need only look at the trend toward
welfare drug testing in the face of both data demonstrating the fiscal
and policy failures and the consistent judicial disapproval of these
programs to understand the continued political value of anti-welfare
legislation to building political capital.246 Although welfare arguably
continues to be the object of the most political scorn, nearly every
program that provides obvious and direct support exclusively to those
in poverty is easily and continuously attacked on the same basis and
with the same hateful tools.
It is certainly true, given this atrocious history and continued
political attacks, that programs that seem and/or are more universal
have considerably more promise for garnering political support.
Ideally it would be far better for the supportive state overall if we had
universal benefits: for example universal health care and a universal
caregiver subsidy. There is no shortage of models for such programs
and, as many have noted, European countries provide many good
examples of what universal support might look like. Having said that,
however, proposing universal benefits in the American context faces
perhaps insurmountable political barriers. Given recent history, some
much more politically promising examples come in the form of
245

Nationally, the effectiveness of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(“TANF”) in serving and meeting the financial assistance needs of those in poverty
has fallen precipitously. For example, in 1996, TANF provided some measure of
assistance to 72% if families in poverty. in 2011, that number had plummeted to the
point where TANF served only 27% of families in poverty. TANF also pays
significantly less to those families. In 1996, TANF provided families with 35% of
the funds necessary to raise that family to the federal poverty measure whereas by
2011, that number had fallen to 28%. A TANF Misery Index, LEGAL MOMENTUM 1
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty/atanf-misery-index.pdf).
246
On the trend to implement welfare drug testing see infra notes 191-198and
accompanying text. On the issues of the constitutionality of these statutes, see
articles cited in note 187.
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benefits that, while targeted toward those in poverty, are structured
through mechanisms and systems that serve those who also not low
income. Benefits like these have recently and productively been
described by Suzanne Mettler as part of a “submerged state,” the
benefits of which both provide significant financial support and,
crucially, are not readily visible either to those who receive them or as
a supportive program of the state.247 A prominent recent examples of
success in that area come the form of the Earned Income Tax Credit
(“EITC”). The EITC is submerged within a regulatory institution and
regulatory framework that administers programs that serve those not in
poverty.
The EITC is administered by the Internal Revenue Service, and, as
is the case for other tax benefits, is granted largely based on selfreporting.248 The EITC has been lauded as one of the most effective
anti-poverty policies in recent years.249 Although it has not been
without its significant detractors, there is no question that the EITC is
tremendously effective in transferring income into the hands of low
income working families and lifting them out of poverty. In 2011, for
example, the combined effect of the EITC and the Child Care Tax
Credit, “lifted 9.4 million people, including 4.9 million children above
the Census Bureau new research Supplemental Poverty Measure.”250
247

SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLITICS UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4 (2011) (arguing that the invisible
nature of many of the benefits received by the non-poor in America, principle
examples of which are tax code benefits such as the home mortgage deduction, are
not visible in political discourse. Mettler makes the argument, quite persuasively
that this invisibility, when contrasted with the highly visible nature of poverty
programs, enables the sustaining, in the American political conversation, of an image
that the non-poor do not depend on the government. Mettler argues that it is
essential for the health of American democracy to make those programs visible, to in
effect emerge the submerged state. While I absolutely agree with this point, I am
using Mettler here slightly differently – to suggest that submerged benefits, precisely
because of their comparative invisibility, have and likely will continue to garner
more political support that visible programs.).
248
Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Welfare by Any Other Name: Tax Transfers and the
EITC, 56 AM. UN. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2007).
249
See, e.g., Chuck Marr, Jimmy Charite & Chye-Ching Huang, Earned Income,
CTR. ON BUDGET 1 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.cppb.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
250
Id. at 9. The Supplemental Poverty Measure was promulgated in 2010 to
provide a more accurate measure of poverty. Like the official poverty measure it
sets a an annual income threshold below which a family is defined as poor. But it is
seen as more accurate primarily because of its inclusion of the effect of tax credits
and governemtns benefits, its inclusion of work related and medical expenses, its
recalculation of the poverty income threshold and its inclusion of geographic
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For the purposes of this analysis, what is interesting is the
administrative structure surrounding the EITC. Like any other
personal tax benefit, eligibility for the credit is established through
self-reporting on a taxpayer’s income tax forms. This system of
administration is a far cry from programs like TANF or the PCAP
program described by Khiara Bridges, both of which involve
significant intrusions and data collection well beyond what is required
to establish financial eligibility for the programs.
Although benefits that are imbedded within regulatory agencies
and programs that serve a more universal population are less visible
and therefore less subject to the overt political attacks suffered by
programs associated with “welfare,” it is crucial to remember that,
even in these more universal regulatory settings, there are plenty of
reasons to worry about the continued targeting of those in poverty. A
couple of examples suggest this conclusion. First, one might recall
that the laws regulating health care, the privacy of medical information
and the use of child welfare and criminal justice administration that
were highlighted in Section III’s discussion of pregnant women
seeking health care do not in fact differ explicitly by race or income
status. We have no law, nor could we given the state of our
constitutional jurisprudence, that calls for the clear disparities in
administration of these laws when it comes to poor black women and
their children. And yet the evidence of disproportionate punitive
impacts is quite clear.251 Similarly, although the EITC is imbedded
within the tax code, it is clear that the IRS focuses a disproportionate
portion of its auditing resources on low income taxpayers.252 These
disparities suggest that, even in programs regulated by arms of the
regulatory state that impact larger proportions of the population, one
must remain vigilant that the poor in general, and poor communities of
color in particular, are not subject to more scrutiny and regulation
within those agencies.
2. Restructuring Poverty Programs and Building New Ones
Though calls for universal benefits and/or significantly increased
variation in the cost of living. Kathleen Short, The Research Supplemental Poverty
Measure:
2011,
U.
S.
DEP’T
OF
COMMERCE
(Nov.
2011),
https://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/supplemental/research/Short_R
esearchSPM2011.pdf).
251
See supra Section III(A)(6).
252
See Leslie Book, The IRS’s EITC Compliance Regime: Taxpayers Caught in
the Net, 81 OR. L. REV. 351, 374 (2002); Ventry, supra note 248, at 1273-74.
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low-income benefits administered by agencies like the IRS might well
address some of the concerns raised in this article, the heart of the
critique falls on what remains of programs designed explicitly to serve
those in poverty. It also falls by implication on those programs,
essential to a robust supportive or responsive state, that might provide
significantly more support to poor families. Addressing the twofold
harm described above (privacy deprivation and punishment) involves
four steps: erecting more privacy protections and higher bars on
surveillance and monitoring in the first place; enforcing and creating
new privacy protections within systems once information is collected;
building higher walls between support systems and punishment
systems, and, finally, exercising significant caution in the face of calls
for coordination and collaboration.
i. Protecting Informational Privacy and Respecting Family
Autonomy
In the support programs discussed in this article, women are
forced, as a condition of either applying for the benefit (in the case of
welfare) or seeking the service (in the case of health care) to part with
vital information that, in other settings and for other people, would be
considered private. Although the demand for and collection of this
information is clearly a harm in and of itself, what’s important here is
that the information (and negative interpretation of the information)
leads to the punishment. The decision, imbedded within formal and
informal legal and regulatory structures described above, to seek a
drug test leads to additional intervention, questioning, and information
acquisition. Doctors, nurses, and social workers intervene and
question, collecting information that ultimately results in punitive
actions against the family by the child protection and criminal justice
agencies.253 One need only recall the sources for facts underlying the
child abuse prosecutions and the findings of Flavin and Paltrow to
recall that health care providers, social workers and child protection
staff provide much of the information to justify punishing these
families.
What if, instead, programs were restructured to protect the
informational privacy of the women involved? What if it were the
woman herself who chose whether she would submit to drug tests and
253

Bridges’s work on the PCAP program provides another compelling example
of the ways in which extensive information gathering is imbedded within the legal
framework and regulatory systems of poverty programs. See Bridges, supra note 55.
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additional interviews. What if the contents of her medical records were
in fact confidential and there were a very high and enforceable bar
against disclosure?
What if we significantly shifted program
eligibility rules and administrative structures to require the gathering
of only minimal information and respected the rights of families to
keep their homes, their bodies, and, in the vast majority of
circumstances, the choices they make about how to parent private?
These proposals almost inevitably lead to calls of caution
concerning the welfare of children, and it is certainly true that we
continue to need mechanisms to intervene in cases of abuse and
neglect. But before concluding that we cannot take the legal and
regulatory finger towards intervention off the scale and rebalance it to
lean much more strongly toward informational privacy, it is important
to remember that, for families who are not poor, this is already the
case. For communities that are not in poverty we apparently assume
as a society that having laws against child abuse and neglect and the
ability to prosecute child abuse is enough to protect children. It is only
in those programs that actually (welfare) or as a matter of practice
(health care in poor communities) serve and target poor,
disproportionately African American communities that we have put
our legal and regulatory mechanism on the scale toward monitoring,
information gathering, information-sharing and escalating punishment.
To rebalance the state toward autonomy is to address this class and
race disparity.
ii. Enforcing Existing Privacy Protections and Choosing to
Incorporate New Ones
To begin to move toward this rebalancing, it is important to note
that much of the information transmission described in this article
happened in contravention of the law. For example, as noted in
Section III, despite significant variations in state law some of which
would have clearly banned some or all reporting, in one of the studies
discussed above, health care providers told researchers that they
reported virtually every substance exposed newborn. In other cases,
there are clear policy choices involved. Although some of the welfare
drug testing legislation calls for reporting to child protective agencies,
some of the are in fact far more protective.254 While the data on drug
testing in the health care setting suggests that these privacy protections
254

For an example of slightly more protective statutes in Georgia and
Tennessee, see supra notes 218 and 223 and accompanying text.
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are likely to provide little actual protection, it is worth noting that
some privacy protections exist. To the extent that this is the case,
research, systemic advocacy and individual representation efforts
designed to expose and punish violation of these protections would
represent a small positive step. In addition, as proposals to impose
drug testing on recipients of public benefits programs on the state and
federal level continue to be presented, for those jurisdictions where
they cannot be entirely defeated, it is worth it to devote advocacy
resources to pushing for strong privacy protections. Finally for those
who provide legal services to the poor, it is also worth it to pay careful
attention to privacy protections within the systems that impact their
client’s lives. To the extent that we can enforce existing protections
and create new ones, this might represent small progress in addressing
the harms described in this article.
iii. Building High Walls Between Support and Punishment
In the examples of regulatory intersectionality above, information
travels with extraordinary ease from the support setting to more
punitive settings. To address this much higher walls are in order. If
we are to restructure poverty-focused support programs to support the
autonomy of poor families, we need to erect much higher walls
between programs that are designed to support families and programs
that are explicitly punitive. If the child welfare system is reimagined,
as the supportive or responsive state would call for, to focus far more
resources on support of families over intervention, removal and foster
care, this would need to include a very strong separation between those
parts of the state that support and the parts of the state that can impose
punishment. Similarly the extraordinary administrative presence of
policing and prosecution in support programs needs to be eliminated.
In the vast majority of circumstances those who purport to offer
support: people like teachers, social workers, doctors, nurses and nonprofit staff simply should not regularly be sharing information with
police and prosecutors. It should be the extraordinary rather than the
expected case that these actors end up as witnesses for the prosecution.
Lest we conclude that this is impossible it’s important to recall, as this
article suggested at the start, that systems of support that look like this
already exist. For those who are not poor this is precisely how support
functions in their communities. While it may be difficult to imagine,
doing so is an essential task going forward.
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iv. Exercising Significant Caution In Settings Involving Collaboration
and Coordination.
A final note involves the implications of this analysis for the
persistent calls and use, within social service programs, for
collaboration and coordination of services. Seemingly everywhere one
looks in the social service, child welfare, and juvenile justice worlds,
there are extensive calls for coordination and co-location of services.
These programs generally include extensive provisions for and
mechanisms to facilitate data sharing among agencies. While there is
no doubt that, in certain circumstances, these efforts to coordinate and
co-locate yield benefits for clients of those systems, the data in this
article suggests that we should exercise significant caution. In
thinking about whether to engage in collaboration we might ask, from
the perspective of regulatory intersectionality, what punitive outcomes
might result from the collaboration? Does the collaboration require
data sharing with agencies that have the statutory power to remove
children and/or to use information to support prosecutions of children
and families? Will the clients be primarily poor families of color? If
so, what safeguards exist to ensure that these punitive outcomes will
not disproportionately impact families of color? What safeguards and
protections exist for families to protect their privacy and to ensure that
the information they share does not end up facilitating their
punishment? Do client’s have rights, imbedded within the program, to
choose only some services and to set the terms of service in a way that
enhances rather than compromises their autonomy? These and other
questions are essential if we are to engage in these projects in a way
that guards against the disturbing outcomes described in this paper.
CONCLUSION
Moving from today’s hyperregulatory state to an autonomyenhancing supportive state is an enormous and daunting task to which
scholars and activists must devote their considerable energies and
talents. By re-centering the question of how to realize this goal on the
lived institutional structures of the today’s domestic social welfare
state, this paper has attempted to give a sense of the daunting
challenges ahead, to suggest some necessary steps in this path, and to
suggest areas for future research and activism. In conclusion though
I’d like return, for a moment, to where this paper began. Imagine
again that you are a person in need of support. You have plans,
dreams and hopes for yourself, for your family, and for your children,
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but it is difficult to realize all of this on your own. You need help.
Depending on who you are, where you are and what your life has
brought so far, the support you need might vary significantly from the
support that others need to realize their own dreams and goals. If the
state provided that support, what form would it take? What risks
should you have to take, in terms of the safety of yourself and your
family, in order to get that support? How best might the state assist
you in realizing your goals? If we can each answer those questions for
ourselves, perhaps at least the task of envisioning a supportive state is
not so difficult after all.
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